

# COMBAT FORCES

Infantry Journal • Field Artillery Journal

JANUARY 1953


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
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## Vol. 3, No. 6

January, 1953

COVER: President-Elect Dwight D. Eisenhower, the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon. (Photos by United Press, Harris & Ewing, Department of Defense and Department of State.)

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# ★ To the Editors . . . ★

## "Stress the Fundamentals"

To the Editor:

Compliments on the November issue. I thought "Stress the Fundamentals," by General Collins, was one of the finest articles ever published. Hope that you can have some more like that.

How about a good article on armor stressing the application of these fundamentals and the close support of infantry and artillery in such a situation?

LT. COL. EVERETT H. RUNKLE  
USAR

3517 N.E. Bryce St.  
Portland 13, Ore.

• Colonel Runkle's letter typifies many other favorable comments on General Collins's article. We'll see what we can do about a similar article on armor.

## Iron Discipline Needed

To the Editor:

I am afraid to speak out critically lest someone think I'm another pipsqueak like Pvt. Hargrove, but I'm mightily afraid that the Army at its lower level is horribly untrained, undisciplined and incompetent.

I say this because I want to see us have a good Army, not because it is unpleasant to me individually.

Contrary to popular belief, the American soldier is at heart a goldbrick, eight-ball and all around yo-yo who would rather do anything than fight. To be sure there are a certain number of priceless youngsters who are hot for bloodletting but they are all too few.

I have seen so many Americans do less than their duty in combat that I am now a violent and unashamed advocate of the cat-o'-nine-tails and the hangman's noose.

Once a soldier becomes used to brutal treatment from his noncoms and the noncoms understand that they are part of an Army, not a Boy Scout troop, then you can begin to treat them decently. By that time they have learned to appreciate leniency. You need not worry about the conscientious soldier—he will stay out of trouble and will be heartened when he sees that the shirkers are forced to do theirs or suffer.

I have seen the American soldier acquire himself with a nobility that is beyond belief. I have also seen many soldiers of other nations doing likewise. But our namby-pamby discipline make us, I fear, the laughingstock of professional soldiers of other nations.

We have the best artillery, splendid engineers and good weapons—everything but superior close-combat troops. We can do much better—and must.

Don't use my name please.

SGT. CHESTY

Ex-187th Airborne RCT  
Korea

## Marine Tanker

To the Editor:

In regard to "The Maintenance Platoon," by Lt. Col. McFalls in the October issue, I would like to comment and add the views of a company maintenance sergeant of a Marine Corps tank battalion.

My section is equipped with an M32-B3 retriever. Our tanks, except for two dozer tanks, are M46 and M46A1.

Often when using the retriever's winch we also use as many as four snatch blocks, depending on how deep a hole the crippled tank is in. The big drawback is the time it takes to rig all this tackle. And in certain conditions, time is everything.

As for towing, an assist from an M46 is a big help. The slippage of the torque converter is a boon to the retriever's clutch. However, I'm not suggesting that our next retriever be equipped with a torque converter type transmission. They stall out too easily.

Here are a few items I'd like to add to Colonel McFalls's "ideal retriever." An individual engine for powering the winch, an auxiliary generator, air compressor for impact winch, and the boom mounted on a revolving turret.

But leave off any kind of hydraulic gear, "A" frame or otherwise. Maintenance of hydraulic gear is too much trouble.

T/SGT. JAMES L. BELL  
USMC

1st Tk Bn, 1st Mar Div, FMF  
c/o FPO, San Francisco, Cal.

## House Trailers

To the Editor:

As a member of the Association and a serviceman who lives in a house trailer, I would like to request the investigation of possible legislation (if not already under study) concerning the transportation cost of moving trailers when servicemen receive PCS orders. As a first lieutenant I am allowed 7,500 pounds of household goods. The Army will crate and ship them to my new post, at considerable cost to the Government. But families with large trailers have to pay from 18 to 28 cents per mile to have them moved. The government pays them nothing to move *their* household goods.

If the government paid each serviceman living in a house trailer 25 cents per mile, it would no more than equal the cost of shipping that same family's household goods.

LT. ROBERT E. SKIMIN

Fort Bragg, N. C.

## Mixed Captions

To the Editor:

In regard to the article, "Why Not SP" by Lt. Col. Moore in your November issue, I believe that the captions under the

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL



pictures of the two 105 motor carriages were switched.

The one at the bottom of the page is the M37 mounting a 105mm howitzer, M4, and the one at the top of the page is the M7 mounting a 105mm howitzer, M2A1, rather than the other way around.

By the way, the 105mm howitzer motor carriage, T98, mounting the 105mm howitzer T96 may be a step in the right direction, except that it falls about nine degrees short of the 75 degrees maximum elevation advocated by Colonel Moore.

Let's have some more articles like that. It was very interesting.

Lt. ROBERT L. QUINNITT

Hq 198th FA Bn  
Ft. Benning, Ga.

To the Editors:

I suppose you have already received many letters on this but having commanded an M7 battalion in World War II, I can't resist pointing out that on page 31 of the November issue captions on the pictures of the M7 and M37 SP 105 How are reversed.

In any case, more power to the SPs! And isn't that 280mm on page 29 an artilleryman's dream!

Lt. COL. W. S. RICHARDS

Hq FEC-CPO  
APO 500, c/o PM  
San Francisco, Cal.


• The eyes of Lt. Quinnett and Col. Richards are sharper than the eyes of the editor who missed the printer's transposition of the captions.

#### Civil Control

To the Editors:

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL is to be congratulated for calling attention to *American Democracy and Military Power* by Dr. Louis Smith, through Colonel Wiener's article in the October issue. No subject is more alive today. I would like to add some comments both on the book and the subject as a whole, and correct some of the impressions, I think, Colonel Wiener may have created. Colonel Wiener's approach seemed to add more heat than light to the subject. He may have considered that he had this license by the fact that he might be preaching to the converted. But others outside of the Army do read COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL, as is indicated by Walter Millis's praise of the magazine in the same issue, and all readers do not share Colonel Wiener's views.

Personally I think that Dr. Smith did a fine job in his book and did it in a moderate manner. He did not provide the answer to the critical problem he posed but he did outline it thoroughly. He catalogued, summarized and evaluated the comprehensive American literature on the subject of government in wartime and has provided thereby a useful documentation of this subject. I think he displayed pene-



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trating insight throughout the book. He defines with concise clarity such abstractions as "economic mobilization" and the "military mind."

His appraisal of us military fellows on pages 110 through 114 is both illuminating and fair and should be a good tonic for all of us.

Colonel Wiener is right in calling attention to Dr. Smith's conclusions. This paragraph, the last in the book, is unfortunate, for it is completely out of tune with the scholarly objectivity of the rest of the book. It may be that this was his starting working hypothesis and when the research did not support it, he still hated to throw it away.

There are other recent books on this subject in which readers of the *JOURNAL* may be interested. These are: *The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief* by Clinton Rossiter (Cornell University Press, 1951) and *The Concept of the Civil Supremacy over the Military in the United States* by William R. Tansill (Library of Congress Reference Service, 1951, Public Affairs Bulletin No. 94).

In these books and in Dr. Smith's the subject of the theme is the impact of the military on the civilian aspects of our society. No one today seems to be much concerned with what effect their expanded role will have on the military themselves. American military men achieved their pres-

ent virtues in a professional isolation under the shadow of traditional Anglo-Saxon distrust. Can they continue to be competent military professionals and at the same time be jacks of all trades in positions of prominence outside their profession to which they are being increasingly called by their countrymen? De Tocqueville recognized the danger in a democracy of the military being contaminated by the civilian point of view. This also should be a subject for study by civilian scholars in these serious days when the military profession is expected to carry an ever heavier and expanding burden.

The professional military man is in the middle of the American predicament of equating our concepts of individual freedom with the authoritarianism that goes with military strength. His growing importance in the military scene requires that he recognize it whether he wants to or not. His countrymen no longer allow him to remain on the outskirts of our national life but nevertheless they still keep wondering if military power and democracy can really mix. For this reason no military man can go wrong in reading Doctor Smith's provocative book whether agreeing with him or not.

CAPT. JOHN D. HAYES  
USN

Industrial College of the Armed Forces  
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# 'Far From Defeatism'

General Eisenhower's statement to the Press at the end of his journey to Korea

I STATED publicly long before we came over here, we came over to learn. We have no panaceas, no tricks of settling any problems. We came over here to get a grasp of the feeling in this part of the world—a look at the situation and a better understanding of many factors that will be important to my associates and myself and to everybody here during the months to come.

Now before I talk a little bit about some of these broader lessons there is one point that has come to my attention that disturbed me a little bit. I heard that some of the units that attended the United Nations review ceremony the first day I was here had come to that field very early and had a long wait and it was cold and miserable, and I can understand very well how those soldiers must have felt.

Now the reason that it disturbed me is this. All my life I have made a point to be on time at any review given by any military formation in my honor. I don't believe in making soldiers wait and so I checked up and I find that I arrived there within a minute or two of the time that I was expected. Nevertheless, I want through you people here to extend my apologies to any soldiers who through some misunderstanding were out in the cold longer than they should have been, because I was highly honored and complimented by their presence. Incidentally that whole ceremony was very symbolic I thought. It was a symbol of the unity that binds together so many nations diverse in their languages, their traditions and their customs but bound together by a common veneration for freedom and a strong determination to defend it wherever it may be threatened. I thought it was a very thrilling experience; certainly it was for me.

Now as we've gone up and down the portion of the battle line we have been privileged to visit, always in the background, always sort of a setting for the whole scene, is the realization of what the Korean people have been through. With war pushing up and down the land, destroying homes and resources, bringing hardships and suffering to these people, it was most remarkable that you could find among their soldiers everywhere such a spirit and élan as was displayed. And that, I find, is merely a reflection of the spirit and élan you find among their people. Mr. Rhee, whom I have been privileged to talk to, exhibits it and shows every qualification of a great leader and all of the others that I have been privileged to

talk to in civil or in private life—I mean in civil government or in private life—and the soldiers. You find it everywhere.

Now possibly, therefore, it was not so strange that you met it in every unit that we visited. As you know, we visited every unit, practically, in two of the corps, and it was really something. With regard to the general things that we learned, we learned about conditions, have a better picture of the terrain, and the possibilities—military and economic. We have been privileged, all of us, to talk with the commanders on the spot—the naval commanders, the air commanders, and the ground and logistic commanders—on the economic situation here, so that, all in all, great benefit should result from this kind of a trip.

And in passing let me remark that in line with what has been my ambition in the direction of unification of services here I see the kind of example that I think we should all follow. I believe, and now I'm speaking more distinctly of the United States troops than of others at the moment, the purpose of bringing us all under the same roof, thinking the same kind of doctrine dedicated to the same broad purposes is here going forward exactly as it usually does when the different services get together and get close to the enemy. I thought it was a very remarkable display of unified, co-operative action all the way through the theater.

With respect to the economic situation, it—as you go around—looks almost marvelous that these people can keep up their determination and keep up their health.

It means, of course, that help is going to have to come from the outside for a long time. I'm not going to talk in detail about the military situation—you people are briefed from time to time by the air, ground and naval commanders, and you know exactly what the situation is.

How difficult it seems to be in a war of this kind to work out a plan that would bring a positive and definite victory without possibly running grave risk of enlarging the war. There are many limitations in a war of this kind, but this much is certain: Here we are realizing that freedom is an indivisible thing—we're all engaged in a common enterprise and that common enterprise, even if we have not been able to state its objectives in definite, concrete terms, and if there may be some misunderstandings or differences of opinion with respect to that—still we are all here to see it through. Much can be done, in my

opinion, to improve our position—that much will be done.

I THINK that I am going to end this little talk with paying again a different kind of a tribute to the Korean nation. It is in terms of confidence in what I believe they can do with intelligent help given not only for their preservation, but in realization again, as I say, of that principle that freedom is an indivisible thing.

I am far from a defeatist on this business, because I passionately believe that freedom represents a course of life that men prefer to Communism and slavery. Therefore, I believe that on this particular corner—this particular phase of this great struggle between these two ideologies—freedom is bound to be successful. All it takes is continuation of the dedication to common purposes which we have so far displayed, and we are going to go forward with that.

Now, all of you people know who have been with me in the past, it is my common practice to ask for questions after such a conference. This I am not going to do today for the very specific reason it is a large conference, and I could not possibly get around, and the time that I have is limited.

As to my future plans, I cannot give them all to you because—I mean my future plans for the ensuing days—because I believe that the day and hour of my departure from here is still something of a secret. But I will tell you this, that on the way home I expect to meet with different members of my staff and study everything we have learned here and improve the time on the way home by digesting the information so that when the new Administration in the United States takes over next January 20 it will be better able to pursue its policy of supporting freedom in the world and conducting American business so it is always in shape to give the support demanded or needed from us.

To all of you, my thanks for the great consideration you have shown me and my party. I know that the theater here asked you to be very circumspect in talking about this visit, and possibly for that there are good reasons, although for me they are always difficult to see. But, nevertheless, my very deep thanks to you for your consideration. It's exactly what you've given me through the past many years that many of us have been together.

Good-by and good luck to all of you.





## What Eisenhower Said

**T**HE prerequisite for winning any victory is a single-minded determination to get the job done; a single-minded dedication to that job. Without such determination and dedication there can be no victory but only a stalemate, only a road uphill paved with excuse and evasion. So to our task we must bring the quality of vigor.

Now let us talk about the wisdom and skill which we need to prosecute this "cold war" that infects nations all around the globe.

Remember this: We wage a "cold war" in order to escape the horror of its opposite—war itself.

In "cold war" we do not use an arsenal of arms and armaments. Rather, we use all means short of war to lead men to believe in the values that will preserve peace and freedom. Our aim in "cold war" is not conquest of territory or subjugation by force. Our aim is more subtle, more pervasive, more complete.

We are trying to get the world by peaceful means to believe the truth. The truth is that Americans want a world at peace, a world in which all people shall have opportunity for maximum individual development.

The means we shall employ to spread this truth are often called "psychological." Don't be afraid of that term just because its a five-dollar, five-syllable word. "Psychological warfare" is the struggle for the minds and wills of men.

Many people think "psychological warfare" means just the use of propaganda like the controversial "Voice of America." Certainly the use of propaganda, of the written and spoken word, of every means known to transmit ideas, is an essential part of winning other people to your side.

But propaganda is not the most important part in this struggle. . . .

What would such a peacetime of "cold war" national strategy mean?

**I**T would mean, in the first place, the selection of broad national purposes and the designation within those purposes of principal targets.

Then it would mean this: Every significant act of government should be so timed and so directed at a principal target and so related to other governmental actions that it will produce the maximum effect. It means that our Government in this critical matter will no longer be divided into airtight compartments.

It means that in carrying out a national policy, every department and every agency of government that can make a useful contribution will bring its full strength to bear under a coordinated program.

We shall no longer have a Department of State that deals with foreign policy in an aloof cloister; a defense establishment that makes military appraisal in a vacuum; a Mutual Security Administration that, with sovereign independence, spends billions overseas.

We must bring the dozens of agencies and bureaus into concerted action under an overall scheme of strategy.

And we must have a firm hand on the tiller to sail the ship along a consistent course.

These paragraphs are from a campaign speech General Eisenhower made at San Francisco on 9 October 1952.

# COMMAND POST FOR THE COLD WAR

## *Frigidus Strategicus*

**I**N the months following the outbreak of the Korean conflict several U.S. divisions were sent to Germany to bolster our forces there and to show the world that we were prepared to live up to our NATO commitments. These were military moves and the divisions sailed directly to German ports and moved into training areas of the U.S. Zone.

It was proposed at the time that one of the divisions be disembarked at a French port and routed through Paris where it could parade. The appearance of a newly arrived American division marching through Paris would be tangible evidence of American determination and would help spike the Soviet propaganda that we expect the Europeans to do our fighting for us. Of course, this would have been a more expensive move than the other, but the propaganda benefits could have been enormous. The proposal got short shrift, if any, in Washington and one reason is clearly because our national policy makers have become so involved in the military task of winning World War III that they are missing opportunities that will help win the cold war.

And yet it is our definite, committed policy to fight a cold war in the expectation that victory in it will prevent a hot one.

This failure is largely due to the lack of an effective over-all command post in Washington that can give direction and meaning to all our cold war efforts. These efforts lie in four principal fields: political, military, economic and psychological. Many of our past failures have been due to overplaying one type of effort and underplaying another. Most underplayed of all has been in the area of psychological warfare.

General Eisenhower recognized this weakness in our organization and at San Francisco on 9 October he outlined his plans for creating an organization in Washington that would call the signals for the entire U.S. team.

A number of postwar moves have given us a stronger security system. The three armed forces have been harnessed into a single Department of Defense; the National Security Council has been formed to coordinate political and economic policy and military power; and the Central Intelligence Agency was created to provide the President with the national estimates needed as a base for his decisions. But the cold war requires something still more—an element in the government capable of giving strategic direction to the operating departments and agencies, similar to the guidance the Army, Navy and Air Force receive from the JCS.

A glance at the present system will show why we need a cold war command post that can think and act and direct all of our power towards victory.

**R**EAL security depends first upon effective foreign policies. The Secretary of State is the principal adviser to the President on these matters. The Department of State in close concert with the Defense Department makes the major contribution to the first essential element in assuring national security—the determination of a sound foreign policy.

As the next step, the NSC selects broad American objectives—such as shoring up the Middle East, negotiating for base rights with Spain, or defending Formosa. The applica-

The author of this article has been in a position to observe some of the deficiencies of our organization for fighting the cold war.

tion of national policy is normally the responsibility of the governmental department or agency having the principal interest in the particular task. The President usually designates one department head as the coordinator of all aspects of a given program. The NSC—the top policy body—keeps out of any coordination of operations.

This arrangement has often broken down. In assisting the President and determining foreign policy, the State Department occupies a special position. In working out its portion of a given policy by traditional diplomacy, it is on a par with other departments and agencies of the government. But as of now, there is no government quarterback, other than the President, who can blend the purely diplomatic moves of State with the military deployment of Defense and the foreign activities of other agencies. This gap is the missing element in our machinery to win the cold war.

**GENERAL EISENHOWER** proposes to fill that gap—to bring “all our forces at the same time under the same plan on the same target.”

This is his plan in broad outline:

“First: We must adapt our foreign policy to a ‘cold war’ strategy that is unified and coherent.

“Second: In spirit and resolve we should see in this cold war a chance to gain a victory without casualties, to win a contest that can quite literally save peace.

“Third: We must realize that as a nation, everything we say, everything we do, and everything we fail to say or do will have its impact in other lands. It will affect the minds and wills of men and women there.

“Fourth: We must choose a man of exceptional qualifications to handle the national psychological effort. He should have the full confidence of, and direct access to, the Chief Executive. I have suggested in other talks that this function may be best worked out through a revitalized and reconstructed National Security Council.”

**THE** President, of course, is superior to all government departments. But he, as an individual, requires a staff group to help him discharge his command functions over the weapons used in today's cold war. The President is confronted daily with big international problems which he cannot possibly consider adequately. He needs a staff to help him weigh and act upon the military, economic, and diplomatic factors involved in the daily changing world situation.

The NSC as presently conceived does not do this. It functions in the manner of a committee of equals and not as a staff. The fallacy of conducting warfare, whether cold or hot, by the committee method has often been

demonstrated. The cold war is in many ways less susceptible to committee management than a hot war. Besides, the Department heads who are members of the NSC are burdened with the operation of large departments. These responsibilities prevent them from being available to work on the problem from the same point of view as the President.

The need for improving the governmental machinery for our psychological and related cold war efforts was officially recognized in April, 1951, when President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board. Confusion and division of responsibility for the charting of strategic offensives in the propaganda,

#### Basic Objectives

**O**UR foreign policy and our military policy are united on three basic objectives:

(1) We will protect and maintain our form of government and our way of life against any challenge and at any cost. On this point we recognize no limit of expenditure or of exertion.

(2) By every means at our command we seek peace. We will not provoke a war against anybody. And we will not wage a preventive war even against an archenemy. But there is one price we will not pay—appeasement.

(3) We seek peace not only for ourselves but for all others. We therefore support the United Nations. The U.N. flag in Korea is not a mere international symbol. It represents our military policy as firmly as it represents our foreign policy. Soldiers and civilians together we are agreed that world peace is an integral part of American peace.

GENERAL BRADLEY  
COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL,  
October 1950

political, economic fields, and military deployment—which taken together spell the Cold War—were behind President Truman's decision to create a separate agency for that purpose. This new agency, an independent unit, operates through the State and Defense Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency, and reports to the National Security Council. It can coordinate and exhort but never direct the departments and agencies that comprise it.

The experience gained by Psychological Strategy Board can help shape the detailed design of the cold war mechanism envisaged by our new President. Its endeavors to coordinate the psychological operations of the member departments

and agencies have conclusively demonstrated that our present governmental machinery is organized primarily for conducting its foreign relations in either a period of genuine peace or in a period of officially recognized war—but not for “cold war.”

**T**O tighten our cold war machinery, General Eisenhower proposes “a revitalized and reconstructed National Security Council.” Barring any claim to prophecy, these characteristics are likely to be incorporated in its ultimate design:

(1) The National Security Council will be given the proper authority and staff to bring into a single focus the plans and operations of all U.S. agencies involved in the cold war.

(2) It will assume, absorb and enlarge upon many of the planning functions now charged to the Psychological Strategy Board.

(3) It will provide the President with a strong staff to which he can look for advice and through which he can transmit his orders and instructions to the cold war battle fronts. Actual cold war operations will continue to be conducted by existing departments and agencies.

**T**WENTIETH century totalitarianism has produced a revolution in the conduct of international relations which combines political, military, economic, and propaganda warfare into a whole, making it more than the sum of isolated functions.

The Soviets believe the crushing of the will to resist or fight is the primary aim of warfare. Consequently, they always give the highest place to means of capturing the “minds and wills of men.” Until recently we have sought to keep Soviet aggression at bay primarily with economic or military aid programs (UNRRA, ECA, MDAP), or as in Korea, we have met aggression head-on with arms. We have sometimes forgotten that we can't win unless we appeal to and capture “the minds and wills of men”—unless we use all our weapons on this vital endeavor.

The creation of the Psychological Strategy Board was the right approach. These beginnings, if transplanted to a “revitalized NSC,” will provide top-level coordination and supervision in behalf of the President on State, Defense, Mutual Security, and other agency programs required to carry out national psychological objectives. Let's take a quick look at these four major programs.

Diplomacy is the tool by which political influence is applied by one nation upon another. While diplomacy is a



major function of the Department of State, other agencies also conduct activity which is political in nature and which should fall within the framework of an over-all plan of political action.

Many elements of government may utilize these political means. The MSA Ambassador in Europe has often been directly involved in political activity in the broad sense by giving support to such undertakings as the Schuman Plan. Likewise, General Eisenhower, while Supreme Commander of SHAPE, had to concern himself with political as well as military affairs. His London speech in July 1951, suggesting a European Army, was one striking example. Military missions, likewise, have political significance. Needless to say, the commercial activities of American airlines and oil companies have political consequences in the strictest sense of the word. The significance of the presence of American oil companies in Saudi Arabia is one bright mark in a troubled area.

The Department of Defense has the primary task to consider the force element in international relations. The military situation, however, can be altered by psychological and economic action outside of the direct competence of the Department of Defense. The scale down of the NATO defense goals for both economic and political reasons is a case in point. Promotion of effective alliances, an essential element in a total military program, can only be accomplished by the most careful support of all other means by which understandings are reached with other nations.

**A**T least four agencies in the government are engaged in purely propaganda activities. Propaganda means the planned use of all kinds of communications to influence the actions of other peoples. A State Department committee now exists for coordinating the purely propaganda activities of these agencies. So far, this mechanism has not created an over-all propaganda plan, nor fully utilized all the propaganda machinery within the Government. It likewise has lacked the authority to suggest and to coordinate actions by which conditions most appropriate for propaganda exploitation could be created.

American economic programs impinging on the rest of the world, such as Mutual Security, or Point Four technical aid, must also be coordinated with the other major forces through which national policies are executed. The Soviets pitch their whole propaganda in Asia

and the Middle East on the promise of economic betterment. In Europe the close connection between our military and economic aid programs is everywhere evident.

In résumé, all departments and agencies have a primary interest in at least one of the four major fields through which foreign policies are implemented. The principal ones—State, Defense and MSA—have a significant interest in fields which are not their primary concern. In the past it has been too often taken for granted that all the activities being sponsored either directly or indirectly by the various departments in a given field represent all that could or should be undertaken. Yet piecemeal planning has left inevitable gaps and duplications in our political, economic and

#### Appointment with History

**W**E are not trying to remake the world in the image of America. We are not trying to force any man to our way if it is not his. We are not trying to buy peace or bring peace with the sword.

But we are a people who are strong in faith and purpose and moral courage. And we have an appointment with history.

If we can show to all the peoples of this earth by measures like those I have described tonight that their hope is our hope, that their goal is our goal, then we shall keep that appointment with history.

And that appointment is the most important that history has ever made, for it can bring peace on earth.

GENERAL EISENHOWER  
San Francisco, 9 October 1952

psychological programs. It is impossible for the Secretary of any department to see the inadequacies of what should be a national "cold war" program from the viewpoint of his own portion of the total job. Inadequacies and duplications can be spotted, and specific improvements proposed, only by individuals charged with guiding and monitoring the tasks of the separate departments from an over-all point of view. This fundamental organization fact underlines most pointedly the need for transforming the National Security Council into the President's right arm for running the cold war.

**T**HERE is a growing awareness in our armed forces that cold war actions are not incidental but directly related to their national defense mission. General Bradley's remark that our Korean POW stand (adopted with regard to the total

cold war situation) may help us go a long way toward avoiding World War III, is a significant example.

The POW issue in Korea and other events are leading soldiers to think not only in terms of material defense but at least as urgently in the psychological element. In this view, the whole SHAPE enterprise is as important psychologically as it is militarily. But this recognition places all of our defense efforts on quite a different timetable. We should be less concerned with some hypothetical future conflict, and more acutely conscious of the one we are engaged in now. Nor should we forget that the enemy believes that he might win without a global war ever occurring.

The Defense Establishment is vitally interested in bringing creeping aggression to a halt without a shooting war. But to date, the positive part the armed forces should play in an all-out cold war offensive has never been clearly defined. The statutory obligation of the armed forces to defend this country against military attack is clear. The contribution they should make to the cold war's prosecution needs equally concise definition.

**A** COMPLICATED but by no means unsolvable problem is how to best harmonize our military preparations for a possible hot war with an integrated national cold war strategy. In the 1953 world the term foreign policy is meaningless unless it intelligently includes the tool of military power. Military deployments abroad are the ultimate expression of our foreign policy. We need a national strategy in the execution of which the political, psychological, economic, and military forces of the nation would all be employed. Without such an over-all strategy the plans and programs developed by civilian agencies of the government and the armed forces cannot be truly effective.

We must continue to plan, of course, to utilize our military power against armed aggression as well as to exploit that same military power to prevent it from ever taking place. America's cold war strategy would create a favorable strategic situation which might by itself bring the decision or else, if war ensues, be best designed to bring about a successful conclusion. If upsetting the hostile communist program becomes a prime purpose of American military strategy, we must seek military deployments that will ensure this aim and which will simultaneously provide sound emergency dispositions. A large order, but not impossible.

# SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


There are no easy black and white solutions for the problems which face this country. How to secure the formation of capital necessary to our plant replenishment, how to secure a tax system which will provide the incentive and the opportunity for the individual acquisition of capital, how to balance between a military organization sufficiently formidable to give any other country reason to stop, look and listen, without at the same time its eating our national heads off—these are segments of a very complex matter which must trouble any citizen who understands it.

JAMES V. FORRESTAL, 18 October 1948

**T**HE greatest Secretaries of War (and some of the most mediocre) have been lawyers. This can be accounted for in part by the fact that it is easy for lawyers to enter politics and successful political lawyers often find themselves serving in the Cabinet of the man they helped get into the White House. There were sixteen Secretaries of War between 1899 and 1947 when the office was abolished. All but four of these sixteen were lawyers! But if this explains why so many lawyers have been Secretaries of War it doesn't explain why the most successful Secretaries have been lawyers. Indeed some of the greatest of the lawyers were not appointed merely because they helped their President politically. Stanton was not Lincoln's original choice for Secretary of War. Neither was Baker Wilson's. And as we all know, Mr. Stimson certainly didn't support Mr. Roosevelt in either 1932, 1936 or 1940. These three—plus Mr. Elihu Root—were possibly the greatest of all Secretaries of War. Some would add the names of Monroe and Calhoun, and for very good reasons.

During the Second World War a number of businessmen served with distinction in the military and naval departments. Colonel Knox and Mr. Forrestal both came to Washington from the business world. Colonel Knox was a publisher and Mr. Forrestal a financier. Mr. Robert Lovett, the present Secretary of Defense and World War II Assistant Secretary of War for Air, like Mr. Forrestal, was a Wall Street financier. Mr. W. Stuart Symington was a successful manufacturer before he entered the Government as Assistant Secretary of War for Air and later Secretary of the Air Force.

But none of these businessmen—Colonel Knox, Mr. Forrestal, Mr. Lovett or Mr. Symington—has represented that class of businessmen whose profession is really Industrial Management. This is a new profession developed by the growth of corporate business. Many Industrial Managers appeared in Washington during the Second World War. The names of Mr. Donald Nelson of Sears Roebuck, Mr. Charles E. Wilson of the General Electric Corp., and Mr. William Knudsen of General Motors are best known. All but Mr. Knudsen served in civilian mobilization posts where they had close relationships with military and naval officers but not in the military establishments. Mr. Knudsen became a lieutenant general and a strong right arm of General Somervell and Mr. Patterson.



**CHARLES E. WILSON**

—the President of General Motors Corporation, was an electrical engineer in his early days. He made the first automobile-starting motor for Westinghouse in 1912 and during World War I he was in charge of design and development of Westinghouse radio generators and dynamotors for the Army and Navy. Later he became a factory manager for General Motors and still later a Vice President in charge of expanding GMC's parts and accessories businesses. In this period he mastered salesmanship, production planning, financing and labor management. In 1940 he became acting President and in 1941 President of GMC.

**T**HE talents and skills of industrial managers are very like the talents and skills successful lawyers-Secretaries of War have used. These include the ability to keep complex activities aimed at the common target. The ability to extract good advice from the bad, usable ideas from unworkable ones, to keep many men working together as a team and not at cross purposes.

A Secretary of Defense capable of devising a machine tool for turning out a complicated piece of armament or of devising a suitable strategic plan would fail if that was the only contribution he could make. And the same is true of the Industrial Managers. Some of them were once engineers, others scientists, or salesmen, or office workers. But each proved he had something more to offer before he vaulted to a higher position in his corporation. In this respect the career of the Industrial Managers is something like the careers of four- and five-star generals. They master their basic arm before moving into combined arms and on into the higher and more difficult reaches where strategic goals are determined and the methods to accomplish them detailed to subordinates.

The biggest contribution of the civilian chiefs of the military departments has been largely intangible and can only be called leadership because only that term embraces the many qualities and conditions such men as Mr. Stimson brought to bear on the job.

But it is leadership in the same sense that has marked the Great Captains of our Army and Navy. And it is the same leadership that marks the most successful of the Industrial Managers.

But even though the same qualities of leadership are needed, the jobs are by no means similar. The Secretary of Defense cannot approach his task in the same way as the Chief of Staff of the Army approaches his. And both jobs are unlike the job of the head of a great and complex corporation. This is because the basic requirements of the jobs are unlike.

**T**HERE are those who say that the lack of an overriding profit motive makes it difficult for an Industrial Manager to succeed in Government. Without that profit motive he can't see any final objective. But this is admittedly difficult for others too. As Mr. Forrestal testified with so much tragic eloquence, a Secretary of Defense might be able to conquer the problem of too many things to do in too short a time, but how can he decide on his objective and retain assurance that it is the right objective through hot and cold wars of unimaginable complexity?

In 1939-41 the War and Navy Departments were bedevilled beyond reason because they did not know where they were going to fight, against whom they were going to fight, or even if they were going to fight at all. They not only had to prepare to fight everywhere or not at all but also had to give away their material sustenance to hard-pressed allies. The Japanese and Hitler solved many of those problems on 7 December 1941, but the present enemy is more canny, is less disposed to let the hide go with the hair as Hitler did, and works endlessly to keep us jumpy and unsure of ourselves.

Such imponderables are hardly within the experience of the Industrial Managers, who usually know what their Boards of Directors want: a business enterprise respected by organized labor, competitors and consumers, and earning respectable profits while looking forward to the future.

But the imponderables that a Secretary of Defense must face are beyond the experience of lawyers and other profes-

## MR. WILSON'S PREDECESSORS IN THE OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE




JAMES V. FORRESTAL



LOUIS A. JOHNSON



GEORGE C. MARSHALL



ROBERT A. LOVETT

sions, too. A well-adjusted philosopher-thinker might view the harder problems of a Secretary of Defense with equanimity and eventually come up with solutions, but he would hardly know how to make the wheels go around while he was cogitating, or how to get the right things done after he arrived at a solution.

A philosopher-thinker might meet the requirements of those who think the Secretary of Defense should be a man capable of hiring people who know how to get things done. But our Government is not organized that way. A Cabinet officer and especially a Secretary of Defense would find that he had no time to think even if he detailed everything to deputies except those jobs that the laws require him to perform. The very physical demands upon him make it imperative that he be a man of action and decision rather than a philosopher-thinker. In someone's immortal words, "he can hire all of the brains" he needs.

**I**T is not as simple as that, of course. The tasks and the responsibilities of a Secretary of Defense are difficult beyond description. If you would know how difficult they are, read again, *The Education of Henry Adams, On Active Service*, by Henry L. Stimson, and *The Forrestal Diaries*.

As Mr. C. E. Wilson embarks on this difficult task we wish him every success and we believe he brings to the job the best possible qualifications for it, limited though they may be when viewed alongside the magnitude of the office. And if he is successful we hazard the guess that the day of the lawyer-military secretary is over, and in the years to come, the Industrial Manager and the soldier will work together for the security of the United States.



# Unified Principles and Procedures

Brigadier General A. S. Newman

A Unified Command is like a marriage: The principals must learn to give and take for the common good.

Brigadier General E. J. McGaw, who was Commander of the Iceland Defense Force at the time Brigadier General Newman (then colonel) served as its Chief of Staff, wrote of this article:

"I concur in the unified principles and procedures summarized in this article. To some it may appear that the principles are rather briefly stated to cover such a wide field. But I think Colonel Newman's decision to keep them brief is a wise one.

"The broad principles will apply in general to all Unified Commands, while a more detailed breakdown would lead to many exceptions and special cases.

"I commend this article to the readers of COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL as a springboard for their own thoughtful consideration of the principles and procedures required for successful unification."



**M**ANY of us have a vague notion that the word "Unification" means integration of the three services and that it's something for generals and admirals to worry about. We also understand that Unification is supposed to save money at the expense of complicating budget and supply procedures. But many of us feel that as fighting men we need not be concerned with what Unification is

or how it works.

I am not an expert on Unification, but as the commander of an airborne infantry regiment who was catapulted overnight into the job of chief of staff of a Unified Command, I learned a few things the hard way about one part of Unification which may be of interest to you. Specifically, I was the chief of staff of the Iceland Defense Force.

To make Unification work there are two facts that must be kept straight: one is the staff and command principles under which a Unified Force operates, and the other is how actually to make those principles work.

Although we had to work out principles and procedures simultaneously in Iceland, an analysis of the lessons learned in our operation should begin with an examination of the principles.

Of course much work has been done and is being done on manuals to govern the operation of Unified Commands, but of necessity these can only be developed through experience. The experiences of the Iceland Defense Force are a part of that development process.

We had three main references:

(1) Specific directives for the establishment of the Iceland Defense Force. These included assignments of missions, some delineation of responsibilities and procedures—but of course these are classified and cannot be quoted.

(2) The basic Command Plan for the operation of Unified Forces, which is also classified and may not be quoted.

(3) A manual prepared and used for instructional purposes at the Armed Forces Staff College, under the title *Staff Officers Manual for Joint Operations*. (This is an excellent guide for the organization of a Unified Staff, but is limited in its scope and the amount of detail included. It has been of great assistance, however.)

After leaving out all classified matters in the references, and examining our experience in Iceland for lessons which may be of help to others, there is still much that can be summarized to clarify the unified picture at the working level.

**T**O begin with, there is nothing complicated or obscure about the primary command channels—it is the *degree of command* exercised by the various headquarters and agencies concerned that is difficult (extremely difficult) to define so that all concerned have a meeting of the minds.

In the case of the Iceland Defense Force, the command channel starts with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, goes to the Chief of Naval Operations as the executive agent for the JCS, then to the Commander in Chief Atlantic (a Uni-

BRIGADIER GENERAL A. S. NEWMAN, Infantry, is now on duty with the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg. He commanded a regiment of infantry in the Pacific during the Second World War and after the war became a paratrooper. He commanded a regiment of the 11th Airborne Division at Fort Campbell before going to Iceland as the chief of staff of the Iceland Defense Force. He has been an occasional contributor to this magazine for many years.

fied Commander), who has delegated his unified responsibilities in Iceland to the Commander, Iceland Defense Force, whose immediate subordinates are the major commanders of the three services within the Iceland area—Army, Navy, and Air Force.

But the "air line business" of Keflavik Airport, Iceland, is under the Commander, Military Air Transport Service (another Unified Commander)—so part of the forces under the Unified Commander in Iceland (who was Brigadier General E. J. McGaw of the Army; since succeeded by Brigadier General Ralph O. Brownfield of the Air Force) are to a very great degree responsible to Major General Joseph Smith, USAF, the Unified Commander of MATS.

Nor is this all. Keflavik is a great international commercial airport, thus subject to international agreements. It

The adjoining is not an official command chart, but is a schematic representation of the general organization for the Iceland Defense Force.

Obviously, the chart could be endlessly complicated by adding more agencies and various types of lines—each of which would indicate a different kind of command, staff, or technical responsibility.

Not shown, but almost always present in a Unified Command, are international diplomatic and political angles.


It thus is abundantly clear that all Unified Command charts must have an inherent flexible quality, which it is impossible to reproduce in lines and words on a printed page.

is also Icelandic territory, subject to Icelandic law.

Obviously, this is a special situation—but it illustrates a major point. Unified commands cannot be reduced to a set form like a regiment of infantry, a Navy ship's complement, or an Air Force group.

Added to these special circumstances is the fact that when you integrate forces from the Army, Navy and Air Force into a Unified Command, the assignment of every individual to the Unified Command is of necessity temporary—but his assignment to his own service is permanent—therefore he not only retains a channel of communications to his own service on certain technical, administrative, and specialized logistic matters . . . but a basic loyalty quite naturally remains with his own service.

This can and often does complicate matters. The chart on this page outlines the problem schematically. If you don't agree with the way the chart is drawn,



that is not surprising, and simply illustrates one of the difficulties within a Unified Command—you probably can't draw a chart that everybody would OK!

That brings us to another unified principle: individuals in command and staff positions must not only be professionally qualified in their service, but they must have facile minds that quickly grasp the varied problems of other services and agencies—and they must be mentally flexible, willing to compromise on occasion. If everybody insisted that everything be done the way it was done in his service, the result would be a continuous series of silly tugs-of-war.

The principle in small things should be that the man who does most of the work should be allowed to do it his way. If there is no scrabble over small things you'll get a smooth day-to-day operation.

**P**ERHAPS we have gone far enough to ask why we have Unified Commands instead of joint or combined commands as in the past.

The answer seems fairly clear. The Second World War proved that the development of modern weapons, transportation, communications, and fighting techniques required a speed in attaining integrated offensive or defensive operations that made mandatory more coordinated centralized control under one man within certain areas. This is not only true in minor local actions, but also in far-flung operations.

We are still uncertain of all details—but Unified Commands are practicable, workable and here to stay.

Thus we come up with another principle: The initiation of Unified Commands is a major change in military organization, and such changes in the past have resulted in disagreements at all levels—so that when we meet them now we should accept adjustments as something normal and to be expected. Once they are viewed in that light, it is easy, by the exercise of reasonable forbearance and objectivity, to resolve disagreements. This brings us squarely up to the fact that when individuals refuse their share of readjustment, of give and take, of objective examination of the other fellow's problems—then they are not qualified for duty in Unified Commands and should be replaced.

Of course there are a number of secondary advantages to Unification, aside from operational efficiency. It reduces overhead, and saves duplication and waste—but procedures for this are still very much in the throes of experimentation and development. In the normal case, the service of primary interest will

exercise both command and logistic responsibility, but there are departures from this rule—and the Iceland Defense Force was such an exception.

A basic principle of organization within a Unified Command is the use of deputy commanders from the two services other than that which furnishes the commander. In this way the commander does not have to go to a staff officer on command matters that concern a service other than his own. In addition, the presence of deputies to augment the command authority of the commander insures a more positive integrated command posture within the Unified Command. It is an intangible thing, but of great importance.

**E**XPERIENCE proves that more staff officers are needed on a unified staff than in a command of similar size of only one service. There are more varied and complex administrative problems, because in general the individuals of a Unified Command are still subject in great detail to the regulations of their own services—thus it is not only necessary to have wide and varied operational knowledge of all three services on the staff, but a similar requirement exists for the three services administratively. It is therefore a great mistake to limit too much the number of officers assigned to a unified staff, especially when administrative and organizational procedures must be established from scratch.

Another thing that needs to be emphasized again and again, is that a good man is a good man—no matter what the color of his uniform.

Every man of all three services must feel that he and all members of his service are not being discriminated against in any way. Each man—Army, Navy and Air Force—must be on a share-and-share-alike basis, and must feel that way.

Here is a small illustration:

The main installation of the IDF is Keflavik Airport, and the air base group which operates it furnishes "common services" for the Army, Navy and Air Force. One of the facilities established was a noncoms' club. Initially, it was referred to as an Airmen's Club—which made Army and Navy men feel left out.

Actually, the Air Force uses the term "airmen" in the same way the Army uses the term "enlisted men," so it was a misunderstanding based solely on the use of words—not intent. (The selection of an appropriate name has more angles than you might think—and at this writing the official name is the Keflavik Airport NCO Open Mess.)

Another thing that bears on this same

principle is the material but intangible difference in the personal relations between staff officers within the three services. The success of a unified staff (at least for the foreseeable future) depends more on procedures worked out between individuals than on fixed regulations. It is evident therefore how important is the principle that staff officers of the several services *feel* they are all on the same footing with their chief.

**A** PROCEDURE of first importance, in my opinion, is that command be exercised through subordinate commanders by a much greater delegation of authority than is normally the case within a single service. Orders should be more general in their scope, and keep to the main issues—allowing the subordinate commander to work out details of compliance. There are many reasons for this, but two are:

(1) A unified commander does not have the technical knowledge to issue orders in as great detail for the three services, as he could for his own service alone—and he should not be tempted into letting relatively junior staff officers spell out detailed orders in his name to commanders of wide experience in their own service.

(2) There is an intangible psychological factor involved. Subordinate commanders of one service do not like a senior of another service breathing down their necks and supervising details they think they know more about than he does.

The answer lies in orders that delineate the action desired *only as far as necessary to get interservice coordination.*

A corollary to this: do not issue orders on procedural matters unless variations within the several services cause conflict, or reduce the effectiveness of the command as a whole. Instructions should not be issued just to get uniformity. *Unification* does not mean *integration*.

The tone of orders issued by a unified commander is important. Within any one service the tone of command changes as the levels of command go higher—an Army corps commander does not give orders to major generals commanding divisions in the same detail or in the same tone used by a regimental commander to his subordinates. A unified commander should consider this carefully—both in written and oral orders.

It should never be forgotten, though, that within the province of a unified commander's authority, his orders are just as binding as those of a commander



within a single service. It is not only important that the commander himself should understand this clearly—but every member of his staff and all subordinate commanders must study and thoroughly understand the degree and scope of unified command authority.

**A**NOTHER thing to keep constantly in mind is that every man in a Unified headquarters must listen closely to differences of opinion, especially if they are voiced by an officer of another service. Your previous training and background may cause you to come naturally to one decision, while the same set of circumstances might cause an officer of another service to come to a different conclusion—and he may have good reasons that are beyond your experience. Listen to his reasons, give him your reasons and then the two of you may find that, where three services are concerned, neither of you is right.

The importance of giving great weight to the opinion of the man with specialized knowledge in another service is obvious. If the problem is one of air lift, the Air Force view can not be lightly set aside by an infantryman. If ship movements are concerned, what does the Navy man recommend? If ground combat plans are being made, the Navy and Air Force should listen carefully to the Army ground combat technician.

And when the Army, Navy, and Air Force commanders all have different views—the unified commander must decide which of the calculated risks pointed out to him he will take.

Many small SOPs must be published for the guidance of a unified staff that are normally covered in any one service headquarters by service custom, or by the detailed regulations of that service. With three services in one headquarters there are almost always three ways of doing things. On the Iceland Defense Force staff we used this to our advantage, by selecting the best of the three procedures. When there was a choice and where it was a matter of opinion, we used the form with which the most interested staff officer was familiar. For example, since we had an Air Force adjutant general, we used his way of numbering memorandums and special orders; with an Army headquarters commandant, we use the Army morning report.

Sometimes we used more than one form. An illustration of this is the format used in official letters. The Navy has by far the best system, but we set the letter up in the form used by the headquarters to which it was addressed.

Operations orders are not a problem. The *Staff Officers Manual for Joint Operations* is our guide. Service components use their own manuals.

When I was chief of staff, we used the Army buck slip and routing system. We did not try to write an administrative SOP from scratch. From time to time we published staff memos on office procedures that required regulation.

**T**WO of our biggest problems revolved around budget planning and logistical support. In general the Air Force, through MATS, as represented at Keflavik Airport by the air base group, was responsible for common services—which includes everything from rations to a centralized TI&E program; from utilities to movies and post exchange service. One of the most important single items of common services was construction.

Of course all of these are also tied into budgeting—and the unified commander is responsible for coordinating the service budgets. This sounds simple, but it isn't. Many of the budget items start at higher service headquarters outside of Iceland—because each service must budget for construction and other items used exclusively by that service.

Without going into detail, there are two salient factors affecting budgeting, logistic planning, construction and operations planning. One is the need for a plans section, which we did not have initially but which we came to consider a necessity. The other is to have this plans section large enough so that at least one senior officer from it can be traveling much of the time to various other headquarters to coordinate papers, clarify details, and to reduce the time lag.

This time lag is a tremendous obstacle. Some papers must go not only to the three Departments, through channels, but may also go to the Department of Defense or to the Joint Chiefs of Staff before a final decision is reached. I can not emphasize too strongly that there is no substitute for experienced and able officers to travel for planning liaison—and, incidentally, to look for papers that somehow get sidetracked.

Much could be written on the problem of getting the necessary funds. The big thing to remember—to keep constantly in mind—is that there is no semi-automatic budgeting for your needs, as in established military installations. When you start planning to do something, you had best start out by doing something about getting the money—because nothing is going to happen until you have the money.

In addition to outlining things to do,

there are a good many things not to do in a Unified Command.

Do not issue administrative orders until the regulations of all three services have been consulted. For example, surveys are handled in vastly different ways by the three services, and you can not unify an administrative procedure of this type short of Department level. Confine your orders in such cases to how to implement the regulations of the various services. Efficiency reports are a similar problem.

About the best suggestion on what not to do is: When you see something being done, *by a member of a service not your own*, which you consider wrong—don't go off half cocked. Maybe that is the way to do it in his service.

The professional military presence of individuals also varies in the three services. To give you an idea, here are some characteristics I have noticed: The Army officer tends to be specific and direct in his orders, and expects prompt compliance (a great virtue in ground combat); the Navy man often appears dignified and remote (the captain-of-the-ship attitude); the Air Force is more relaxed and free and easy (don't tense up at the controls).

**I**F we take all the principles and procedures discussed here and reduce them to one over-all principle, we find the answer to this question:


*In general, what does it mean to be Unified?*

It means that you serve under a new organizational and command principle within the Armed Forces of the United States. There are many directives on the subject and many varying ideas, but the basic principle is simple.

When elements of the three services are united under a Unified Command, the fundamental foundation is the same as that in marriage. They are united for their common good in a special way which deprives each of them of some rights and privileges—yet at the same time reserves to each of them certain rights and privileges.

As in any marriage, there always will be problems. Most of these problems develop in the early stages of the marriage, and there must be a period of adjustment in which all parties participate. Unfortunately, the initiation of a Unified Command does not begin with a honeymoon.

Unification is a challenge. It is hard to accomplish. But when we meet the challenge individually and collectively the result is bound to be the greater security of our country.



## DOES WAR WORRY YOU?

*We can't afford the fears and misconceptions that we all bear about the enemy, so let's face up to the facts—they aren't as bad as we sometimes think!*

**Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg**

**D**O the 175 divisions of Soviet Russia worry you unnecessarily? Can a U.S. tank battalion (medium) combat a medium Soviet tank regiment on equal terms? How many Red soldiers do you feel capable of holding off in combat? Surrounded and cut off, would you be inclined to surrender, or fight your way out?

We can't carry A-bombs in our hip pockets, but we've got to carry some tough self-confidence with us or we'll be beaten. Mental toughness is as important as howitzers—both have to be built, and then put to use. The high incidence of our mental cases in World

War II revealed that for all our claims to greatness, too many Americans lacked a sufficiently tough frame of mind. There was neither time nor sympathy for the mental misfits in the Red Army during World War II; the trend has not changed any in favor of the psychiatrists—if the Soviet Army has any.

We can each well pause to ask ourselves, "How mentally prepared am I for more war?" Of the surrounded and cut-off GIs in Korea, none to date has turned guerrilla, but a few with great credit have fought their way out rather than to raise their hands to almost certain death and slaughter. We need more of this breed.

In the face of foes who outnumber us we cannot risk becoming victims of fear and misconceptions nor should we be mesmerized by certain German military experts who rub the lamp of their own defeat to produce that frightening genie—the "tough and unbeatable Soviet soldier."

Unfortunately many misconceptions have been bred or sustained since World

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War II. There has been the view that the average American is a super mechanic and that all the Army needs to do is to put him in uniform, give him a screwdriver and heat tablet and he will become jet-propelled. Conversely, the Soviet soldier has been profiled as a stupid swamp-animal who lacks initiative and has so little mechanical ability that he can't service a can of Sterno. There are also misconceptions about the Asiatics. Until the conflict of Korea many "experts" propounded the theory that Chinese and Koreans didn't know how to take care of complicated weapons like jets and tanks. There is the view that Asiatic officers do not understand logistics because their supply columns consist of bullocks and horses. However, their tanks still run on modern fuel and shoot killing shells even if contaminated with manure en route. We should realize that the Asiatic must resort to his own methods in accordance with his own scale of values and equipment. This is not to suggest that we lower our own logistical sights, but let us recognize and examine facts and get rid of some ideas that are as false as the once-held theory in America that a million men will spring to arms overnight.

**T**HERE are some good reasons to be concerned about the manpower ratios that oppose us, but we shouldn't be frightened by the millions of males in Communist countries. They are not all Communists. I have seen Asiatic hordes pour into battle and they are not any more willing to do so than other men. Some are less so. I have seen Chinese Communist divisions retreat in fright when there was really no threat before them. In general, Asiatics know when to throw in the sponge. When the going is bad they surrender in large numbers. There is of course a hard core of men who do not. Some can be violently tough. None is a pushover. But they will surrender—as in Korea after the landing at Inchon.

The Chinese Red Army never militarily licked the mass of Chinese Nationalist armies in the Civil War. The Reds conquered because Chinese Nationalists defected in droves. Big though it is, the entire Red Army of China is not a volunteer army. Until Korea, it had never faced modern fire power on the ground, in or from the air. The initial prisoners we took confirmed this in their statements. The Chinese Red Army can be licked!

Soviet Turcoman soldiers raised their arms high and quick in surrender to the Germans who in turn converted them

to the Axis cause as soldiers. We took them prisoners in Italy. Other Soviet Asiatics proved none too good as die-hard devotees to the Red cause.

We can never win a campaign or a war if we let the size of an enemy "get us down." All of us must discard this mental handicap. We'll probably always be outnumbered. We must get used to the fact, and proceed in confidence from there. We can achieve local superiority in many strategic places, and again, this superiority may not be just in men. Air power, like naval power, does not spring from the sheer number of males within a given country.

**D**ESPITE common knowledge that campaigns and wars of today are won by combinations of joint forces, the current practice is to measure an oppo-



nent in terms of divisions. The term division is as obsolete as the term "phalanx" insofar as it denotes strength on the modern battlefield. What is a division? In our own army it is 18,000 organized and equipped men. Nowhere in the world are there better designed combat organizations for the number of men involved than our infantry and armored divisions.

The Soviet Army has a reported 175 divisions. Does this mean 175 times 18,000? It does not. Soviet divisions are of three main types: rifle, tank, and mechanized. They range between ten and twelve thousand men each, with cavalry divisions of a strength less than 5,000. It is obvious that in terms of

armament and numbers our division would occupy a frontage almost double that of a Soviet rifle division. There are other strength factors which could place our division more or less on par with two opposing Soviet ones. But, to the soldier in combat, the fact that two Red divisions are opposing his one, could be mentally disturbing unless he knows that the term division has many meanings. The same is true of Chinese armies. They are not armies, but corps.

We tried to maintain our divisions at nearly full strength in World War II. The Soviets tended to fight all their divisions down, but the label of division stuck even though some divisions only numbered a few thousand.

Earlier I posed a question about the combat equality of a U.S. medium tank battalion and a Soviet medium tank regiment. Without entering into the details of unit organization or tank versus tank, the answer to the question is that our battalion is superior, mainly because it has more tanks than does the Soviet regiment. Here is Communist nomenclature at work, and it applies to other units as well. Comparisons must be made in respect to actual strengths, and not titles. The Chinese Communist and other Russian satellite armies also give high-sounding titles to small units. We should not let titles scare us. That is what they are designed for. The falsity of Communist nomenclature and definitions should be known to us by now if we simply view the Red trend to give new definition to "democracy."

There have been numerous profiles made of the Soviet soldier. You have to know your author to be able to accurately judge the real truths. Too many of these sketches are overgeneralized or lead to erroneous conclusions because they seek to lump in one individual the varied characteristics of millions.

With a battle background of bitter experience, death and defeat, the Germans are inclined to build the Soviet soldier into a super animal. From this enduring monster of German fears one can range down to some American descriptions of the Russian, who is characterized as a dull sloth lacking in imagination and initiative. Considering the number of bridges the Soviet soldiers built out of locally "scrounged" materials, one could safely generalize that Soviet soldiers are possessed of considerable initiative and not a little imagination. It is important, in this respect, to orient our soldiers on the actual history when hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers surrendered easily, and then equal num-

(Continued on page 28)



# Promotion Problems

*Readers write in, finding fault with the article of the same title in the November issue and asking, "Find out why I didn't get promoted."*

**F**EW articles in recent months have drawn as much mail as "Promotion Problems" in our November issue in which the editors attempted to spell out "personnel's" difficulties in establishing promotion policies. If the letters did nothing else they certainly confirmed what is no secret: that there is a great deal of discontent and some misunderstanding of current policies.

A few of the letter writers individually designated the Editor of *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL* as their agent to go to the offices of the Career Management Division to study each officer's record and talk over the record with CMD officers. The Editor has accepted these requests and stands ready to act as the confidential agent of any officer on a similar assignment so long as the number of requests doesn't completely swamp him.

The Editor has seen our present G1, General "Tony" McAuliffe, whose office has received many more letters of the same type. General McAuliffe says that he will go into any officer's promotion situation with that officer in person.

In the following paragraphs we shall quote from a few of these letters in an effort to show the nature of the complaints about promotion policies and the present attitude of many officers towards them. Each letter has been answered personally, giving the writer all of the information about his own case that we have been able to obtain.

## **Infantry or Armor**

"I am one of the 26 in the class of 1934 who were jumped over in the promotion of temporary colonels. I wish particularly to find out if my being in the infantry played any part in being jumped and if I would have fared any better had I been in Armor (in which I served during most of the war).

"Will this pass-over be continuous up until the time I become eligible for permanent promotion?"

"What action should I take with a view to alleviating this situation?"

## **Point of Origin**

"When the 1951 Selection Board list of those picked for permanent colonel in the Regular Army was published, I noticed that two West Point classes were picked almost en bloc, and that hundreds of integrated officers had been passed over. I looked up the records of the five general officers constituting the board, and found that three were West Pointers and two

were graduates of Annapolis. Thinking this would never occur again, I did nothing about it, but the 1952 board selected the Class of 1930 almost en bloc, and even went back and picked up a few West Pointers who had been passed over by previous boards.

"The composition of selection boards should conform to the list of candidates. If 100 West Point graduates and 400 non-USMA regulars are up for selection, the selection board should be composed of one USMA general officer and four general officers who are not graduates of the Military Academy."

## **No Complaints**

"I haven't a complaint. When I joined the Army in the 1930s I expected to be a captain in 1952 but I am a lieutenant colonel and have been for almost eight years.

"I would like to know what the chances are for my promotion to full colonel. I personally would be very happy if all temporary promotions to full colonel were made on the basis of the permanent list. However, the powers have decided otherwise and I note that some officers junior to me on the promotion list will soon be my senior. I hope this will not continue!"

"Because I was unfortunate enough to be in a T/O outfit overseas in the early years of World War II, I didn't get a temporary promotion early enough to become eligible for consideration for the last full colonel list. Neither my permanent nor my temporary rank qualified me. My commander tried to get me in as one of the five per cent to be promoted without regard to age or seniority, but it was turned down with the explanation that the five per cent was only to take care of aides.

"Apparently there are quite a few of them."

## **Integrated Officer**

"I feel strongly that the Army has broken an implied promise to officers who were integrated on age, namely that age would be a determining factor in future promotions.

"I am approaching 37 years of age, a major for just two years. I rank ahead of the USMA class of 1941 in permanent rank but have no hope of promotion, whereas members of that class (all younger than I am) are almost all lieutenant colonels.

"The switch of the promotion policy to temporary rank is responsible.

"During the war I was with a division that saw but a few months of combat and had no casualties to speak of. I went through all battery officer jobs and became a battery commander. All of my record was superior and I was integrated with the first increment in July 1946.

"The perpetuation of wartime promotion achievements as a basis for promotion now is an injustice to me. I am now one full grade and more behind my contemporaries with no hope of ever catching up.

"I get so depressed at times over this situation that I would resign except that I know I could never be happy outside of the Army. And yet there is the stubborn fact that I am five to ten years behind many officers of my own age."

## **Incentive and Ambition Gone**

"I was a first lieutenant in Korea on temporary duty status before the outbreak of the Korean Conflict. I remained on the same assignment until August 1951.

"After U.S. units were committed in Korea an order was issued which made company officers who performed duty in the next higher grade for 30 days eligible for promotion. I was recommended for such promotion in July 1950 but the papers were turned back because I was on temporary duty status. Therefore, I was not finally promoted until December 1950. During this period I was filling a major's T/O vacancy.

"Six months later I was highly recommended for promotion to major but G1 turned it down, despite good indorsements all along the line. The reason given was there were too many majors in my basic branch in the Far East Command at the time. *The job I was doing had nothing to do with my basic branch.*

"That briefly outlines a specific case of an officer being in the right spot, but who failed to be promoted because of a sudden change in policy.

"I have discussed the promotion situation with many officers in the past few years, and it is amazing to me how many of them say that all I have to do is 'keep my nose clean.'

"I do not accept that as the healthiest way to keep the officers of the U.S. Army at their best. It is all too true that when incentive is taken away, ambition also disappears. I sincerely feel, and I know many officers will agree with me, that incentive is gone and ambition is withering away under present promotion policies.

"I hope I am wrong."

## Priority of World War II Service

"I have served in a G1 capacity on high level staffs and so I am quite aware of the numerous problems connected with promotion policies. Certainly it is impossible to satisfy everyone and there are bound to be cases of inadvertent injustice to individual officers. I feel, however, that there is little or no reason to attempt to justify the present policy on the grounds that it is much better than it used to be.

"When I graduated from the Military Academy I was assigned to an outfit that went overseas before Pearl Harbor. There were few position vacancies in it and consequently few opportunities for promotion during the months when the Army was expanding and promotions were rapid in the ZI. Many of my classmates were promoted to major while in Replacement Training Centers while I was still a captain doing the work of a major in a regular outfit with no hope of promotion.

"Because of this initial block, I did not attain temporary lieutenant colonel in time to be in the zone of consideration for promotion to colonel in the recent selections.

"Judging by this record there is nothing which should qualify me above any of my contemporaries. My subsequent record, which should have some bearing, doesn't because promotion policies give high priority to date of temporary rank attained during World War II.

"I finished in the upper third of my class at Leavenworth but some of my classmates who finished below me are now colonels.

"I was ordered to the Far East and went into combat as a battalion commander in Korea. I served six months in Korea and was decorated with the Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, Bronze Star for valor, and Purple Heart. I received a letter from my division commander recommending me highly.

"I am confident that if my Korean service had occurred in World War II, I would now be included among the list of officers selected for promotion to colonel.

"My question is: How much longer will dates of temporary rank as a result of World War II service receive high priority over subsequent service or over the service of those officers who through no fault of their own did not receive rapid promotions during the Second World War?"

## One Bad ER

"I am a captain in the Regular Army. My date of temporary rank is 16 November 1944. My date of permanent rank is 2 January 1949. I am drawing longevity pay for over 14 years' service. The officer just beneath me on the promotion list was promoted to the temporary grade of major on 16 November 1950. I do not appear on the eligible list for promotion as published this year.

"Briefly, here is my story. I was integrated into the Regular Army as a first lieutenant in 1946, presumably because I had some of the qualifications considered

necessary for a Regular Army officer. I was rated in the Excellent-Superior bracket for the next few years and subsequently promoted to the permanent grade of captain, presumably because I had the qualifications considered necessary for promotion to that grade. I was requested, by name, for a special assignment in a foreign country where I served for several months with a rating of Excellent. Then "Casey lowered the boom!" I don't think that it is necessary to go into the gory details except to say that the commanding officer and I had a "falling out." For the sake of the story let's assume that he was 100 per cent right and that he gave me an accurate, unbiased, fair efficiency report of Unsatisfactory. (Actually it was slightly better than Unsatisfactory and I do not concur that it was an accurate, unbiased, fair efficiency report.)

"After returning to the U.S. I was assigned to the service school of my branch for the advanced course. In accordance with the regulations, an Academic Report is rendered on officers while attending a service school and no Efficiency Report is rendered for that period. Therefore, when the Board met to select officers for the big promotion program, my latest efficiency score, the one on the top of the pile, was little better than Unsatisfactory. Ergo . . . no promotion.

"Since that time, however, my efficiency reports have indicated that my performance of duty is again superior.

"Can I be promoted?"

"No, sorry old boy, but you are not on the eligible list."

"When will a new selection board meet?"

"Oh, we can't tell you that, even if we knew we couldn't tell you that."

"What is the answer? It amounts to this . . . my future in my chosen profession is split wide open by the opinion of one man. No one has bothered to consider that possibly that man was wrong. Incidentally, an evaluation proven wrong by subsequent efficiency reports. If I could be promoted today (which is impossible until a new selection board meets) there is no provision for restoring my lost seniority, not to mention the lost pay.

"So you see, it is another case of 'Giving the guilty so-and-so a fair trial and then hanging him.' One difference though . . . I didn't get a chance to present my side of the story (which is a good one if I do say so myself)."

## Reserve Officer

"My military career began in 1915. I served as an officer in combat in the First World War and I now have more than 35 years of continuous service in the National Guard and Officers Reserve Corps. In about a year and a half I shall reach the compulsory retirement age of 60 and yet I am still a lieutenant colonel.

"I was a major in 1941 when ordered to active duty. As you know, there were practically no promotions of reserve officers in those days, particularly in the field grades,

and I was still a major in June 1942 when I went overseas—at the invitation of a famous soldier who then commanded one of the best divisions in the Army.

"I served in the division in responsible staff jobs during its first campaign and was ordered back to the U.S. as an instructor in April 1943. When I returned there were no position vacancies in the U.S. because of the wholesale promotions in the U.S. during the months I had been overseas. Consequently I was denied the promotion customarily awarded an officer returning from combat. I was assigned to the school of my arm of the service. I was there a year and then was ordered to troops as an Executive Officer of a unit in training. Three times during the year I was at the school I was recommended for promotion—in June 1943, December 1943, and February 1944—and each time I was turned down because of lack of position vacancies. I was finally promoted to lieutenant colonel in June 1944 through the efforts of a major general who became interested in my case. During these months many youngsters who were lieutenants in 1942 and babies when I was fighting at Chateau-Thierry in 1918 had become lieutenant colonels without ever having been outside of the U.S.!

"I went overseas again in October 1944 and served through the Rhineland and Central Europe campaigns as an Executive Officer of a combat unit and part of the time its commander. I remained in Europe until November 1945.

"In January 1946 a very serious illness in my business connections made it necessary for me to return to civilian life—and at a time when three more months of service would have given me a separation promotion to colonel.

"Since the reorganization of the ORC in 1946-47 I have been active in it as a commander and higher staff officer and have qualified four times under four separate sets of regulations for promotion to colonel but each time I have been turned down because of some hairsplitting technicality . . . designed, it seems to me, solely for the purpose of keeping reserve officers from becoming colonels.

"Why it is, may I ask, that an officer with 35 years of continuous voluntary, enthusiastic service, with voluntary combat duty in both world wars—four times qualified and four times recommended for promotion—is penalized and denied promotion? And in effect, because he sought and accepted a combat assignment in 1942.

"And why is it that in the 'temporary' TDs—which are never made permanent—that qualified reserve officers may be promoted to any rank except that of colonel? The TD under which I am now serving has vacancies for colonels but I can't be promoted solely because of this restriction!

"For nearly 40 years I've always believed that a good job well done would eventually earn a square deal from the United States Army—but lately I've begun to wonder."

# Talking Tactics

*If you plan and execute a speech just like you do an attack, you'll wow your audience and convince 'em, too*



*Find 'em & Fix 'em*



*Fight 'em*

**Captain Clay Schoenfeld**

ILLUSTRATED BY GEORGE WARFEL

THE phone rings on what had started out to be a pleasant morning at Camp Longstreet. It's the Old Man calling.

"Major Doakes," he says, "I have an interesting detail for you. The Cold Creek Kiwanis Club wants somebody to give them an eyewitness account of NATO developments. You're just back from EUCOM, so I've told them you'll be there next Wednesday noon."

"Yes, sir," says Major Doakes, "but Colonel, I've never done much public speaking, sir."

"Nothing to it, Doakes. And while you're at it, put your thoughts down in a form that would make a good article for one of the service journals. About time this command was breaking into print again."

"All right, sir. I'll do the best I can." The Old Man's receiver clicks down ominously.

If you haven't yet been in Major Doakes' shoes, it's only a question of

time before you will be. More and more of us are being asked to hit the knife-and-fork circuit and tell our experiences and opinions in magazine articles.

There is no real mystery about how to draft an effective speech or write an entertaining and informative article. The principles—the tactics—are exactly the same as those of small-unit combat.

When you lead an infantry unit in the attack, the first thing you have to do is *find* the enemy. Then you *fix* him so he's pinned down and can't maneuver. Next you *fight* the enemy by enveloping his flanks or, if he's widely extended, by penetrating his center. Finally you *finish* the job with a shock-action assault.

Now these tested principles are exactly the same ones you use to engage, hold and win an audience. First, you *find* your target by determining the best appeals to use and then by using them to arouse interest. Next you *fix* your audience in its seats, so it doesn't squirm around and so that it gets exactly what you're trying to put across—which you do by stating the theme of your message clearly and concisely. Then, you *fight* to develop your topic, shooting facts, statistics, anecdotes, and examples, at

them. Finally you *finish* the job by restating your case with a bang.

Of course we're assuming that before you tackle your job, you've collected, collated, and evaluated your material. In short, we're assuming you have something to say.

Then just as the principles of combat dictate that every combat team, regardless of size, is made up of a holding force, a maneuvering element and a reserve, so the principles of composition dictate that your piece has an introduction, a main body, and a conclusion.



*Finish 'em*

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Let's consider now the techniques and the "weapons" we can use to gain ground, to punch our ideas over.

Your beginning—your *finding* and *fixing* force, has four purposes: to catch the reader's eye or the listener's ear; to arouse his interest; to supply him with a theme; and to entice him to read further or listen attentively.

So your beginning should be simple, short, appealing, and aimed at the target; and it should be a vital part of the whole thing.

Your beginning usually falls into two parts. One is the forceful statement of the idea of your story or speech, given in terms that will immediately let the reader or listener see the relation between your words and himself. The other is an elaboration of the idea in a way that will hold his interest and carry him on into the body of the story. This may be a dramatization in the form of an incident or anecdote, or a string of revealing facts that hammer the subject home. Sometimes the forceful statement of your central idea will come first. Sometimes the beginning will start with the "come-on"—the collection of interesting facts or the anecdote—and follow with a clear statement of the theme.

For example, in this article I opened up with what is essentially the script of a little play, posing a familiar problem in such a setting that my military readers could put themselves (I hope) right into the situation. This was my "come-on," designed to arouse interest. Then I came through quickly with what is intended to be a clear, concise statement of the gist of my piece—that the principles of composition are just the same as the principles of combat.

To *find* your target, your beginning must be slanted to the audience. This article is slanted at a military audience. But when Major Doakes begins to draft his Kiwanis Club speech he must slant it at an audience of businessmen.

To *fix* your target, you must get to the point quickly, then lead your audience directly into the composition. To keep them up in the air indefinitely as to what you are talking about is as bad as to commit your maneuvering platoon before you have built up a base of fire. And to use a rambling series of "funny stories" that have no particular bearing on your theme is as bad as to order a tactical maneuver that doesn't converge on the objective.

**N**OW that you have found and fixed the target, how do you fight? With your old friends, *fire* and *movement*! You present your arguments by alternating

between the fire of direct declarative statements and the movement of descriptive paragraphs.

The thing to do in the main body of your talk or article is to figure what your people know and what they don't know, then write or speak accordingly, relating new, unfamiliar facts to old, familiar experiences. Link your factual statements with the probable experiences of your audience, on their level of understanding. Whenever you present a general principle, show its application in a specific case, and quote the way

to keep at a high pitch, trained, ready for anything."

Then he asks the reader a direct question:

"How can combat effectiveness be created and maintained before the fighting starts?"

He supplies a reply:

"Partial readiness is not the answer. Unless we have some outfits ready to go when the whistle blows we would pay a high penalty as we have in the past."

To support his statement he pulls out a quote:



somebody else has stated it or tell a pointed story. No matter how complete your facts, your audience won't remember them for ten minutes unless you take the trouble to find specific illustrations for each statement you make.

In Major Norman Locksley's article, "Alert Units," in the *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL* of January, 1952, there was a good example of what I mean. At one place he made this declarative statement:

"If the Korean war simmers down, and if a Grade A, certified redhot and uneasy, chip-on-the-shoulder kind of peace lasts for many years, we will have

"As General Marshall put it (19 February 1951): 'If we had immediately available a trained reserve that could have been quickly brought into action, that Korean attack would never have been made. But if made, it would have been suppressed, I think, long before this.'"

Not content with this, Major Locksley clinches his argument by painting a picture for his readers in everyday colorful terms:

"Company L of the Umpteenth should be as ready as the West Miasma Volunteer Hose Company to slide down the

pole and roar off to the scene of action."

He then goes on to his next declarative sentence, which he elaborates on by giving another series of incidents and anecdotes, examples, statistics, descriptions, dialogue, direct quotes, and figures of speech.

An article or speech without the *fire* of sharp declarative statements is as weak as a squad attack unsupported by a BAR. An article or speech barren of the *movement* of documentary paragraphs is as suicidal as a frontal assault. It's the combination, the swift change of pace, of *fire* and *movement* that does the trick on the manuscript page as it does on the battlefield.

Use this fire-and-movement technique and you're a cinch to bracket your target. In short, you can best entertain and inform your listener/reader by guiding his interpretation of abstract words and phrases through the use of concrete cases, colorful illustrations, and lively examples.

There isn't anything new about this, of course. It's probably as old as writing. In the form of parables, it has helped make the New Testament live for each new generation.

As you move from one fire-and-movement "patrol" to another, be sure to lead the reader by the hand, so to speak, by using plenty of simple connectives and by making the "skeleton" of your article crystal-clear. Give your listener a terrain map and a compass, in other words, so he never gets lost as you move him from point to point, from introduction to conclusion.

The conclusion itself ought to be short and forceful. Its job is to *finish* your target off with a clincher—a telling argument, phrase or story, and a recap of your main points that will let your reader/listener know he's been hit hard with an important idea, an idea worth remembering. Don't just let yourself run down like a worn-out jeep.

**N**OW for a few words on the employment of weapons. In drafting a piece or a talk, there's no substitute for the steady, machine-gun fire of plain talk.

There's no place in writing or speaking for public consumption for the stilted, tail-backwards, alphabet-soup-and-fifty-cent-word-loaded staff-paper style. The gobbledygook of the military is as bad as that of the lawyer, the doctor, the economist or the educator.

When you come to address the public, toss overboard the passive verbs, the complicated structures, and the technical lingo that load down most GI documents. Write just like you talk—in

plain, everyday, unvarnished language. Use contractions, repetition, sentence fragments. Define your technical terms in plain words whenever you have to use them. Use comparisons with everyday things and routine experiences.

There's no such thing as good English in the abstract. The prime requirement of good writing and speaking is not just to follow the rules in a book. The big test is making yourself understood. The one question you ask of every word or phrase in an article is simply this: "Does it get my idea across to my audience?"

A Veterans' Administration "expert" recently wrote in a letter to an ex-GI: "The non-compensable evaluation heretofore assigned you for your service-connected disability is confirmed and continued."

Now this may be exact A-plus textbook prose. But that doesn't make it good English when you consider its mission. It failed completely to reach the objective. The former soldier wrote back, "What the hell do you mean?"

So another VA official, with a sharper sense of good English, replied: "What we mean is, there hasn't been any change in your physical condition so you still won't draw a pension."

The other day I asked a colonel, who appears frequently in the public prints, this question: "Jim, how do you throw off your professional mantle and write so clearly?"

"Well," he said, "I use a very simple field expedient. I just ask myself how I would explain each of my points to a barracksful of recruits, and then I write that way."

Suppose you wanted to tell a civilian audience how important it is in combat to seize and hold high ground. Would you talk like this official directive?

"A fundamental that must be emphasized at every opportunity throughout all tactical training is the careful analysis and use of terrain. This should include the determination of key features or localities, especially any dominating ground."

Or would you talk like this?

"Always go after the high ground. I don't care where the enemy is, if he hasn't had sense enough to get on the dominant terrain, you've got him licked. Let me give you an example of that from my personal experience on Guadalcanal. There was one dominant hill. When we got that hill, there was just nothing left to it thereafter. With the dominant terrain in our hands, there wasn't anything that the Japs could possibly do to stop us."

Beneath your professional dignity to write or talk like that? Nonsense. Those last are the words of General J. Lawton Collins.

The writers of official manuals and directives might well use the language of the Chief of Staff as a model.

And be sure you bring the big picture down to life size, and give your audience a package small enough to grasp and digest.

Whenever you are writing or talking about a division or a regiment, focus from time to time on a particular or typical small unit action, or even on a particular soldier. Whenever you are describing, say, the functions of an RTC—focus on the course of one typical selectee through the camp. Whenever you are describing a series of events—say, in the life of a general, focus on one point that is so significant that you can hang much of your story on it.

The focus technique was at the heart of Ernie Pyle's success as a war correspondent. Ernie never wrote about the big units. He always wrote about Cpl. Jack Jones of Co. B. That is why the Fifth Army's days and nights of travail in Italy are indelibly imprinted in the memories of thousands of Americans in terms of the dead body of Captain Waskow coming down a moonlit Liri Valley trail on the back of a mule.

**J**UST as the individual soldier is the most essential infantry "weapon," so human-interest manpower is vital to lively composition. Packs, vehicles, and troop units, and most of the other gear of war are inanimate and essentially dull. But soldiers are interesting. The use of names, if you don't overdo it, will personalize your article/speech and will also lend authority to it. Write or talk about people—doing things—that are unusual—and/or important, rather than about campaigns, strategy, howitzers, and bivouacs as such.

One honest-to-john, breathing, swearing, eating, shooting man on the firing line of your composition is worth more than an impersonal regiment.

Well, that's my own attack.

Reams of copy have been written on the art of writing/speaking, but it boils down to this: *find 'em* with sound reconnaissance, *fix 'em* with a base of hard facts, *fight 'em* by fire and movement, *finish 'em* with a shock-action clincher, guarding all the while with machine-gun plain talk, rifle-fire accuracy, pinpoint focus, and human-interest manpower.

O.K., Major Doakes, you take it from here.

# What's Wrong With the Infantry?

A plain-spoken sergeant says the trouble with the Infantry could be fixed quickly if we had real noncoms with real authority

## SFC Armored Infantryman

I WOULD like to sound off a little on the current question, "What's Wrong With the Army?" except that I would like to substitute the word infantry for Army.

Everybody says the NCOs aren't doing their job. Okay, why aren't they doing their job? There are several reasons, from my viewpoint. I have had about ten years' experience with the infantry both in the Army and the Marine Corps and in that ten years I have watched the infantry and to my mind it's not what it used to be.

**Point No. 1** is pride. Without pride an infantry outfit *can't* be any good because that's all you get out of being in the infantry, an inner pride, because you know that you've served in the outfit that does the *real* fighting and you don't have to look up to anyone. When a noninfantryman can get combat pay the same as an infantryman the doughboy has to have something that will make up for the unfairness of it and that something is *pride*. All he can do is look down his nose at the artilleryman or engineer and say, "Okay, you SOB, you're getting as much money as I am but I worked ten times as hard for mine as you did." But if he just feels sorry for himself when he says it and doesn't really feel superior, he doesn't have pride.

As the old saying goes, the NCOs are the backbone of the Army and that's right. An outfit can have lousy officers but good NCOs can always bring it through and good NCOs are mighty scarce nowadays. Plenty of the present-day NCOs were good ones at one time but now they just don't have it. What is it that they don't have? That's right, pride again. Why not? Reason number one. Too many chiefs. There are too many NCOs nowadays. The Air Force has changed their ratings so that the only NCOs (if you want to call them NCOs) are first-three-graders. The Army used to have specialist's ratings. Why don't we get them back? Or bet-

ter yet, why doesn't the infantry distinguish between rates? I'm a 1745 myself but the mess sergeant (pardon me, mess steward) wears the same chevrons that I do. So do the supply sergeant and the motor sergeant.

Army Field Forces says the infantry needs distinctive devices on the uniform. I agree. I think the infantry needs an entirely different uniform, one that would stand out and identify the soldier as an infantryman, the elite of the Army. Nowadays anybody can be a noncom in an infantry rifle company. Wear the stripes, I mean. But can anybody *be* an NCO? Hell! no, it's common knowledge that only a small percentage of American men possess the necessary qualities of leadership. So how can we expect a BAR man or a mortar gunner or jeep driver or company clerk or supply clerk or mess cook or just any joe in a squad to be a real NCO? He may be a good soldier and know his job but there's a lot of difference between being a rifleman and being a squad leader. We need a strong distinction between line NCOs (1745s and 1812s) and support NCOs.

**Point No. 2** is too little confidence in NCOs. Officers seem to be afraid to trust anybody below a SFC nowadays to do little things, such as sergeant of the guard, or coaching on firing line. If a man is treated as an inefficient slob, he'll act like one. Here at my post the sergeant of the post guard has to be a master sergeant and the corporals of the guard have to be sergeants first class. It's silly as hell to call a sergeant the corporal of the guard. It's little things like that that make a NCO feel like a stooge. Noncoms should be handed their responsibility and then if they don't do their job they should be reduced. But nobody likes some little beardless second lieutenant breathing down his neck especially if the lieutenant doesn't know half as much as the NCO himself.

**Point No. 3** is poor officers. There

was a time when a sloppy infantry officer couldn't be found and the officers were more or less duty bound but nowadays some of them look sloppier and dope off more than the NCOs could do in a whole hitch. Nobody can give me an excuse. There isn't any. How the hell can we have a good infantry if so many officers are adjutants at heart? Get on the officers and let them get on the NCOs and the ball will start rolling. But until *all* the officers start trying to set an example, the infantry will continue in the same rut.

**Point No. 4** is training is too easy. If a man runs his butt off every day and has to work harder than anybody else he'll feel prouder. Instead of sitting in some classroom all day trying to stay awake, let's spend about twenty per cent in the classroom and the rest in the training area getting a physical workout instead of trying to devise a way of staying awake.

**Point No. 5** is no freedom while on liberty. At this post we can't go to town and drink in peace. A man who has put in a week of good hard training has to go out and blow off a little steam on the week end but here you get a DR for even sleeping on the bus back to camp. I don't mean that a soldier should be free to tear up the town and get away with it but a fight among soldiers shows that somebody has a little pride in his outfit. There was a time when no SOB talked about another man's outfit without getting a chance to back up what he said. But here the civilian police arrest you and lock you up and after you get through paying their wages you come back to camp and get punished again by being reduced if you're an NCO or court-martialed if you don't have anything to lose. It isn't right and never will be.

I think these five things are the main things wrong with the infantry today and if they were straightened out the little things would take care of themselves.





Let the soldier march with good grace, holding his head gallantly,  
his face full of gravity and state; for he is not as other men . . .

# WHAT'S IN A NAME?

Major Reginald Hargreaves

ILLUSTRATED BY THE AUTHOR

IN the *London Daily Telegraph* for 29 June 1951 appeared the following news item:

New York

United States Public Relations officers have been notified they are not in future to refer to the American soldier as a G. I. They are to call him a soldier. In ordering this in an official bulletin, the authorities said, "The term soldier is ancient and honourable."

To at least one reader of this paragraph, whose contacts with "GI Joe" and his officer in two World Wars have left him with the warmest esteem and regard for a remarkably sound type, this intelligence could only be a source of unqualified satisfaction. An honorable

← "... Men who fought for money"

calling rates an honorable appellation; and there is no term too dignified for the man who stands as a barrier between the democratic way of life and the barbarism that seeks to overwhelm it. That is a position of trust whose tremendous responsibility confers a potent and very special quality on any man who upholds even the smallest part of it: his just claim on public respect and gratitude should be reflected in the name by which he is known.

There can be no reasonable objection, of course, to a friendly nickname, a *nomme d'usage*, for the soldier in his more unbending moments, so long as it is strictly confined within its own particular terms of reference. To deny the fighting man that human touch would

be to relegate him to the category of an inhuman robot. "GI Joe" himself responded cheerfully to the name of "Doughboy" not so many years ago. The British soldier has been known in turn as "varlet," "Old Cruse,"<sup>1</sup> "lobster,"<sup>2</sup> "bloody-back," "swaddy" and "Tommy Atkins"; the French linesman as "*sans culotte*," "*vieux grognard*," "*vieux moustache*," "*piou-piou*" and "*poilu*"; the humourless Russian as "Ivan"; the dour German as "*feldgrau*" and "Fritz."

But there is something firm and solid about "soldier" which seems to suggest a man who confronts the world four-square; a master-craftsman, steady, unimpassioned, upright and unblenching; with an integrity as impervious to injury as his unassuming self-respect.

Moreover, "soldier" is an ancient name, and one the years have brought a full meed of honor. Time was, however, when it stood for something very different from the enheartening image it conjures up in the mind today.

THE armies of olden times were recruited under a feudal system of land tenure which called into the field a body of men who fought to preserve the personal stake they held in the land of their birth. In effect, a man took up arms to defend the way of life he preferred above all others.

The principle of *scutage* (shield money), however, permitted the individual, in some circumstances, to commute his obligation "to attend the King in war" into a money payment. With the

<sup>1</sup>The name given to the veterans of the Crusades, as the soldier of the British 1914 Expeditionary Force is referred to as an "Old Contemptible."

<sup>2</sup>From the steel-clad men of Hesselrig's Troop in Cromwell's Parliamentary Army. The name was also given to the "Red" Marines, or Royal Marine Light Infantry, and during the 18th century to all red-coated Infantry of the Line.

funds thus accumulated, the practice arose for the Sovereign to hire mercenaries to supplement his ordinary feudal levies. It was to these purely professional warriors that the name soldier was first applied.

For such men fought, not for a stake in the country of their birth, not for a way of life that above all else was dear to them, but for money. That was what they were after—good hard cash; of which, as often as not, a heavy pre-payment had to be handed over before they would consent to take the field at all.<sup>3</sup>

To such contract-warriors, very naturally, was given the name which derived from the *solidarii*. They were men who quite frankly fought for *soldi*, or money. For patriotism, the defense of an ideal, played no part in inspiring a mercenary to take up arms; and thus the name of soldier lacked the dignity and human worth which hallows a fighting man who responds to his country's summons without any sordid preoccupation with regard to personal gain.

By mid-sixteenth century, with the first appearance of standing armies—in-augmented by Charles VII of France—the need for hired mercenaries steadily diminished. Gradually they passed away, leaving behind them only the memory of their prowess, and the name of "soldier" for the man who had made a trade of war.

BUT the original implication—that the soldier fought for what he could get out of it—most certainly failed to apply to the man who drew the beggarly wage of a member of the regular fighting forces. As the scarlet roll of war un-

<sup>3</sup>An anticipation of the system of giving bounties on enlistment, which was such a feature of 18th century armies, and which so strongly characterized the Continental Army and the Militia of the War of Independence.

MAJOR REGINALD HARGREAVES, British Army, retired, is a writer and illustrator who delves with zestful curiosity into the dust and gloom of military archives and comes up with fresh, tantalizing, meaningful lore.



*"A uniform coat and a cockade are sufficient reasons . . . not to assist the soldier."*

folded, the old meaning of the word soldier was forgotten. Yet many a long year was to pass before it attained the honorable connotation which is its pride today.

Recruited to a regrettable degree from the misfits and outcasts of society, and dreaded for generation after generation as a potential instrument of tyranny, for century upon century the soldiery's claim on popular esteem was negligible—save, of course, when a war-stricken country was frightened into a sudden recognition of their usefulness as a sword and buckler between the cringing bodies of the citizens and the aggression which threatened them.

Truth to tell, enlistment on an indefinite term—which really meant for life, or until too disabled for further service—at a pittance which entirely failed to keep pace with the depreciation in the value of money and the rising cost of living, held out insufficient attraction to bring the right sort of recruit

into the ranks. The indifferent quality of the human material with which the few worthwhile volunteers were supplemented, from the sociological as well as the military point of view left nearly everything to be desired.

In England, the whole situation was aggravated by the evil repute earned for the man in the red coat by the soldiers of Cromwell's army throughout the whole sour period of the Puritan Protectorate. Employed as *agents provocateurs* and as a sort of contemporary Gestapo, to enforce the rigors of a furiously repressive puritanical law—a posse of soldiers, amongst other things, could even force their way into a man's house on the Sabbath, to ensure that he was not indulging in the carnal sin of cooking himself a Sunday dinner, or even so much as peeling a potato—it is small wonder that the civilian population came to regard any man in a military uniform with dread and loathing. And the tradition of detestation not only persisted ob-

stinately in England, but crossed the seas with the *Mayflower* to take solid root in what was to become the United States.

**F**OR in due course, even the men under Washington, in arms in defense of American liberty, found themselves the recipients of scant sympathy from those of their fellow countrymen who had managed to evade the hazards and privations of service in the field.

"A uniform coat and a cockade are sufficient reasons for the inhabitants why they will not assist or relieve the soldier's distresses," reported the indignant Colonel Michael Jackson to General Knox. Colonel Ebenezer Huntington, writing to his brother, even went so far as to affirm, "I despise my countrymen, and I could wish I could say I was not born in America. I once gloried in it, but am now ashamed of it. The rascally stupidity which prevails, the insults and neglects which the Army have met with, beggars all description."

Napoleon's meteoric rise as the military ogre of Europe obviously threatened England with submergence under the ever-expanding flood tide of Gallic victory. But even so, the esteem in which the redcoat was temporarily held was little more than gratitude based on a lively anticipation of favors still to come. It was an unedifying sentiment, which had been pithily anatomised, so early as 1620, in the searching lines of Francis Quarles; who wrote out of the depth of his own bitter experience in arms:

*God and the soldier we alike adore  
When on the brink of ruin, not before:  
After deliverance, both are alike required:  
God is forgotten, and the soldier slighted.*

At the end of the twenty-year struggle, the men with the muskets were still regarded, as their Commander did not hesitate to affirm, as "the scum of the earth"; although my lord Wellington did have the grace to add, "It is only wonderful that we should be able to make such fine fellows out of them."

William Napier, the historian of the Pensinsular War, with his infinitely greater humanity, could find it in himself to pay a far more generous tribute to "the patient, hard-working, brave but obscure soldier, without whom, and his rough virtues, one would vainly hope for glory, or the country's safety." At least in the eyes of the discerning, the soldier had so striven in his country's cause as not to be entirely without worth and honor.

But the more general attitude of contumely and distrust had scarcely abated even by the turn of the 19th century. For an article by a serving noncom-



missioned officer, which appeared in an issue of *The Naval and Military Gazette* during 1845, roundly averred that, "The soldier is condemned and despised by the associates whose society he has been accustomed to from earliest intimacy. He is shunned by his relatives; and the fond and doting mother, the kind, affectionate sister, look upon him in much the same light as it has been my unhappy lot to witness in a mother and sister parting from an embarking convict." There were as yet few to recall the charge of the dying Emperor Severus to his sons, "Cherish the soldier."

It was, perhaps, the inescapable "professionalism" of his calling, the isolation from the rest of the community which his vocation entails, that did as much as anything to perpetuate the odium in which the soldier continued to be held. It is all too easy to dislike a person you do not really know; to feel kindly towards another human being is always difficult without a certain degree of intimacy. The man in the uniform jacket was too remote to escape the defensive mistrustfulness which characterises the majority of folk in the presence of something they do not fully understand. We are instinctively *en garde* against the unknown.

It was different, of course, with a bellicose Germany, where the soldier was held in rather naive adulation; while France belauded an army it hoped would never be called upon to prove its quality in anything more serious than punitive colonial police-work. But in the United States, a Republic wherein the dollar is the uncrowned king, a man had to have the root of the matter in him to a very pronounced degree before he courted the commiseration of compatriots to whom the adoption of so (literally) unprofitable a way of life as soldiering almost amounted, in the eyes of the up-and-coming, to a confession of failure. In England, the man in the King's jacket was an embarrassment to his relatives, and such a cause of offense to the general public as to be barred the best seats in the theatre and the more exclusive bar (saloon) in a tavern; while for his officer to have appeared in uniform at any social function which brought him into contact with his ordinary civilian fellows, would have been regarded as so outrageous a solecism as to call for prompt and withering rebuke.<sup>4</sup> Purely Service clubs were looked upon with dark suspicion as the probable centre of conspiracy against "the liberty of the people"; and Rudyard Kipling could

write, without arousing his fellow-countrymen to the slightest sense of shame:

*O it's Tommy this and Tommy that, an'  
"Chuck him out, the brute!"  
But it's "Saviour of 'is country" when the  
guns begin to shoot.*

It was the two great campaigns of 1914-18 and 1939-45 which established the soldier in the high esteem he now enjoys in the eyes of all who have had the common sense, and common decency, to assess him at his intrinsic value. It was so obvious that he was the champion who took and gave the blows in those stupendous struggles for the freedom of the individual to which all opponents of totalitarianism were so resolutely pledged. It is equally plain, in this present hour of danger, that his onerous task must be taken up anew in the face of an even darker threat to liberty.

The men who fought against the hosts of Germany and the swarming legions of Japan, as the men who now face the hordes of Communist imperialism, can never be rated as mere mercenaries or jetsam from "the common sewer

of unemployed labor." For, like Cromwell's "Ironsides," "they make some conscience of what they do"; they "know what they fight for, and love what they know."

**S**OLDIERING is not a trade any more than it is a profession. It is something infinitely more lofty and exalted—a calling, a vocation. It is to that high plane in the scale of human values, once held by the self-dedicated Crusader, that the soldier, at long last, has been restored. For in these precarious days the world has been forced to recognize the grim validity of Francis Bacon's penetrating dictum, that "The principal point or greatness in any State is to have a race of military men." It follows that a man privileged to enter one of the armed services has every right to regard himself as something superior to the ordinary ruck of his fellow creatures; for he is consecrated to the most exacting and self-testing, but at the same time the most elevated, role a servant of the state can be called upon to play. Uplifted by this selfless spirit of dedication and dignified



"... the carnal sin of cooking a Sunday dinner."

<sup>4</sup>Other than a Hunt Ball, oddly enough.

by the sense of responsibility and quiet pride that accompanies it, his prestige is, rightly, the envy of that many who have failed to qualify for the choice company of the elect. In all sobriety, to affirm that is in no way to pitch the tone too high. For it is not the language of exaggeration which insists that the man who, with good heart and high courage, hazards all the perils and privations of service in his country's cause—even to the point of life-sacrifice itself—is "not in the roll of common men," but is of those of whom it may be said, in all reverence and sincerity, that they "are set apart and made peculiar to God."

It is the soldier's destiny continually to prepare himself for a tragic enormity which he hopes will never occur, perpetually to gird himself for a disaster he is as unwilling to provoke as he is helpless to avert. For as the late Field Marshal Lord Allenby so bluntly pointed out, "Soldiers don't start wars; politicians start wars; soldiers end them." The ones to watch are the sabre-rattlers in frock coats; for "as history has repeatedly proved, it is not with the brass-hats but with the brass heads that the danger to a country lies." But even when policy is best-intentioned, it may fail in its objective; for good will in one Government is helpless against ill will in another. Then the case is such as Talleyrand, the politician, put to Ney, the soldier: "When my work fails, then yours begins."

**T**HE prime object of all wars is to bring about a better and more stable condition of peace; a consideration which is as sharply in the mind of the soldier as in that of any man. For let it never be forgotten that the soldier of the freedom-loving peoples is not the enemy of peace, but its guardian; not the violator of liberty, but its champion.

It is that honorable status which has given a new, a deeper and more to be venerated meaning to the name by which the fighting man is known.

So, as stout old William Garrard recommended, so long ago as 1591:

"Let the soldier march with good grace, holding his head gallantly, his face full of gravity and state; for he is not as other men. So shall he go, and he shall be esteemed and honored and commended by all the lookers-on, who shall take wonderful delight to behold him."

"What's in a name?" demanded the lovelorn, inexperienced daughter of the Capulets. A very great deal—if the name be "Soldier."

\*General George C. Marshall.

## DOES WAR WORRY YOU?

(Continued from page 17)

bers resisted grimly. There is no typical Soviet soldier.

Man for man the German soldier outfought the Soviet soldier, and so did the Finnish. The Russian Tommy gunner is as good as rubles can buy, but he is no superman. Much has been written about the wintertime endurance of the Russian. Does his body freeze at a lower temperature than human beings of other nationalities? If so, then there is something to be said for the Soviet Army's issuance of vodka. Actually the clothing inequalities between German and Soviet troops made for the real differences in winter. The American soldier is the best clothed and fed of any nationality, and should therefore have at least as great, if not greater stamina than his opponents.

No nationality has a monopoly on bravery or heroism, but the Communist soldier will advance to death with less hesitation than some other soldiers, for a bullet in the back awaits those who hesitate to carry out the "suicide orders" of Red officers. American soldiers should take satisfaction from the fact that their officers do not uselessly sacrifice them.

If fighting means dying the quickest, and in the largest numbers, then the soldier of Communism outranks all others in the world. But the American fights mighty hard to *survive and fight back*, which means that man for man he can be the best providing he is mentally strong enough not to let masses over-worry him.

**T**HERE is no high rejection rate of physical and mental misfits in the armies of China and the USSR. Military manpower in those countries is measured by the number of men who can walk on two feet and carry a weapon. Even though many of those uniformed bodies may be wracked with malnutrition and disease, ten pounds of rifle and fifty pounds of clothing and gear do not make these males maladjusted soldiers. The time may come when we shall have to lower some of our physical standards, at least for some of the less arduous military tasks. Our medicos have rejected husky football players and very often other men who wanted desperately to fight. There ought to be more realism about that.

There are some critics who recommend we lower our logistical standards to the level of Asiatic armies. Such trends toward Stone Age practices of "living off

the land" will only slow up campaigns and increase our attrition. Our soldiers can do without Stateside luxuries so as to lessen the logistical burden, but it will take some serious orientation to get this point over and at the same time preserve morale. However, it can be done—and must because the real tonnages to be transported are in fuel and ammunition. The American soldier should take great hope and confidence from the fact that he is better supported than any other soldier. In logistical planning and execution we are years ahead of any of our opponents. Hungry men without ammunition are prone to surrender regardless of mental toughness. Let us not undermine our soldier confidence by surrendering to the theory of shoestrung logistics.

**H**OW many of our guerrilla-harassed soldiers in Korea in 1950-51 knew of the "hopeless" campaign our soldiers had waged against brutal partisan actions in the Philippines at the turn of the century? If they had would they not have been greatly encouraged to outlast their ordeal? I think so.

The tradition of our Army has been badly neglected insofar as it is applied to our soldiers. We have failed to indoctrinate them sufficiently with our military history. Generations presently in arms should be told of generations past who bore arms and suffered. Ours is not the first generation to fight, but some would think so. Instead of bringing our new troops into the rich and colorful field of our military traditions we have put them in uniform only to permeate the camp atmosphere with all possible civilian influences and programs. Even the bands (and there are too few) play swing music to what some regard as the neglect of military music—which after all is military and makes one feel a part of the profession. Let's not apologize for the Army. Let's make our new soldiers like the service for what it is, not for how many juke boxes we can plant on the post. To do this means some of our training time must be devoted to our military history, to battles where small numbers won against large, to men who never gave up, and to facts about our enemies, actual and potential. The physically toughened body will only endure in combat as long as the mind is tough and determined. We must toughen both our minds and our bodies.

# MOBILITY

## AND THE FIRE DIRECTION CENTER

**Lt. Col. John D. Byrne**

Unified artillery fire direction for all heavy weapons not organic to the infantry battalion would give us better use of ammunition and fuel and increase our battlefield mobility

IT is suprising but true that in this age of speed the infantryman on foot is the fastest thing on the battlefield. Trucks, trains, ships, and aircraft cannot move ammunition and gasoline fast enough for the rifleman to take full advantage of his tactical opportunities. "We never had ammunition enough," wrote General Bradley in *A Soldier's Story*, "to shoot all we needed. . . . In Normandy, unloading . . . 35,000 tons a day, . . . there wasn't enough ammunition to go around and the beaches couldn't carry more.


"As we raced across France . . . the bottleneck shifted to transportation. Although by now there was plenty of ammunition piled up in the Normandy dumps, even the Red Ball Express could not carry enough of it to the front."

It may be impossible ever to catch up with the fleet-footed doughboy, but it should be possible to partially close the gap.

To do so, we must first concern ourselves with the mobility of the ammunition and transport required to dump heavy indirect fire—the modern tornado of shells, rockets, and

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LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN D. BYRNE, Artillery, is a member of the English Department at the U. S. Military Academy. During the Second World War he commanded the 39th Field Artillery Battalion, 3d Infantry Division, in Africa, Sicily and Italy. The illustrations are by LIEUTENANT COLONEL E. W. JACUNSKI, Infantry, of the Department of Military Topography and Graphics, USMA.





bombs—ahead of the infantry. Transport itself is a special problem, since the trucks, much of the railroad and aviation equipment, and the fuel for all of these, must move overseas in ships.

Obviously then, to increase battlefield mobility we must achieve economy of force from factory to foxhole. That is, we must get more fire power, more tactical advantage, out of each ton of ammunition.

For this very purpose, a system of fire support coordination centers exists to tie together all means of fire support: artillery, naval gunfire, and close air support—at all levels of command, from battalion to army group. But we have already noted that modern weapons can bankrupt any transport system. To seek the most economical use of the fire power at hand, therefore, we focus our discussion at the foxhole level: on the regimental combat team—infantry regiment and field artillery battalion. Specifically, we focus upon heavy indirect-fire weapons. We will not consider the 60mm or 81mm mortar, or any direct-fire weapons, such as tank guns, machine guns, or recoilless rifles.

With the wisdom of hindsight, we can say that the greatest area for improvement of the heavy indirect-fire support system is within the combat team itself. Recent experience has divided the mission of direct support, formerly the undivided role of the direct support artillery battalion, among a number of attached weapons units. Actually the division of mission was brought about for good and sufficient reasons: the terrific load imposed on our infantry regiments in World War II; the post-mobilization appearance of many new weapons; and the late-in-the-war diversion of air, antiair, and anti-tank forces to their secondary role of direct support. But it is now time to point out that permanent division of the direct support mission is harmful.

In my opinion, therefore, direct support should again be unified as the mission of the direct support artillery battalion.

For division of the primary function of direct support—combat intelligence—is dangerous, if not impossible. The direct support artillery battalion is, simply stated, a front-line federal bureau of investigation. This FBI maintains agents (liaison officers and forward observers) at infantry regimental, battalion, and company headquarters. It improves their operations by establishing additional observation posts and Army light aviation in the regimental sector. And it knits together the reports of all these agents with that fine survey instrument, the 105mm howitzer. That is, the howitzer locates any point which it has fired within ten yards or so. An artillery survey ties the gun data to map coordinates.

Thus does the artillery FBI assemble a picture of the latest enemy activity, coupled with the plans and locations of the supported infantry regiment. This latest news of friend and foe determines the safe-to-fire line. No indirect-fire unit can shoot efficiently in the regimental sector unless it leans heavily on the combat intelligence produced by the direct support artillery. Isn't there an old saw to the effect that most tactical troubles take place on the boundaries between friendly units?


Of course, combat intelligence cannot be directly divided. In practice, the attachment of assorted weapons units to the regiment divides the artillery S2 function by splitting communications resources, especially radio frequencies. And

radio frequencies are the heart of direct support communications because tactical emergencies usually coincide with poor or disrupted telephone systems.

**E**ACH indirect-fire unit which would support a regiment requires a minimum of four radio channels—at least one for each supported infantry battalion sector, and one for interior fire control. But there is a serious probability that four radio channels per direct support artillery battalion cannot be provided in theaters employing large numbers of troop units. This scarcity of radio channels, therefore, is the most pressing reason again to unify the direct support mission under the artillery battalion of the regimental combat team.

A parallel division occurs in ammunition supply, the shock instrument of indirect fire. Under attachment, command control is supposed to go to the infantry commander because the attached units are directly under his thumb. But, in the case of heavy indirect fire weapons, attachment does not mean control; attachment means only the authority to expend the ammunition actually in the hands of the attached units.

For the minute the infantry commander—company, battalion, or regimental—starts to deal with a committee of liaison officers from attached weapons units, true control of heavy support fire passes to the offices of division, corps, and task force G4s. That is, the G4s, matching 24-hour-old expenditure reports with available ammunition and transport resources, are the only persons who can find out the sum of the blank checks filled in by the liaison officers during the previous day.





Thus we see that the system of "attachment" and "G4 control" produces an unhealthy condition in the command, staff, and communications of the regimental combat team. For, if there are several attached heavy indirect-fire units, the infantry staff and communications must take on more and more artillery work to coordinate them. At the same time, artillery resources do less and less. Furthermore, G4 control soon means rationing of artillery ammunition. Consequently, the artillery loses the "feel" of the heavy fire fight, and hence is unable to give the traditionally excellent artillery combat intelligence to the infantry commander.

Moreover, the trend to attach has gone to outright insertion in the infantry tables of organization. I refer, of course, to the 4.2-inch mortar company, which is nothing more than a regimental artillery battery. Of course it is not our purpose here especially to attack the use of the 4.2-inch mortar company. I simply show that it is a violation of the principle that the artillery should shoot all heavy indirect-fire weapons.

**W**ITHIN the regimental combat team, the solution is to have the direct support artillery battalion fire all heavy indirect-fire weapons. Then the artillery battalion commander becomes, in fact, the combat team artillery officer. This solution takes the artillery load off the infantryman's back, and also gives the doughboy his only advisor for indirect-fire.

As soon as the regimental commander makes full use of his artillery officer he gains:

- (1) A single agency to deal with fire power.
- (2) Full use of the infantry staff and communications to control the rifle units.
- (3) An integrated combat intelligence picture assembled by artillery observation and communications resources.
- (4) The application of economy of force to ammunition, transport, and fuel.

**A**T/O change in the regimental combat team is necessary to get artillery interference out of the infantry staff and communications. The 4.2-inch mortar company should be transferred to the direct support artillery battalion as an organic unit.

The artillery battalion could make better use of the mortar company as an all-around weapons outfit. That is, the artillery battalion could train the 4.2-inch mortar company to fire a family of weapons, for example, 4.2-inch and

155mm mortars; 4.5-inch and 7.2-inch rockets. The weapons and ammunition could be drawn from corps depots as needed for the situation.

Artillery observation and liaison parties could adjust the fire of the mortar company; the two radio channels now given the mortar company would help the artillery to retain its ideal of four channels; the present problem of coordinating the 4.2-inch mortar company with the artillery battalion would disappear.

Stated in another way, the artillery battalion plus its special weapons battery would take over all jobs requiring the attachment of an indirect-fire-weapon company or part of a company to the infantry regiment.

Tactically, such a reinforced artillery battalion would reduce the clutter of stray vehicles, reconnaissance parties, and small CPs in the forward areas. In addition, a stronger direct support battalion would add to the combat team's shock power and depth. For, in the opening seesaw of a major war, the artillery may well have to engage in an occasional fire fight to execute its support mission.

**C**AN a light artillery battalion fire all heavy weapons in the regimental sector? As an observer of a few busy afternoons in a direct-support fire direction center, I can say that the present difficulty of the light artillery commander is responsibility without control. That is, "attached" weapons support shoots up the available ammunition, cuts into the number of radio channels available for artillery, and lacks the means collectively to plot all fire missions as a "safe-to-fire" line. My recommendation to use assorted weapons within one battalion will undoubtedly bring complexities of supply and training to the direct support artillery; but this broader mission will also bring a resultant simplicity to staff, communications, and command within the whole combat team.


And a little experience with the broader mission will, I predict, bring a much-needed emphasis to the 105mm howitzer battery as a unit of direct support. For that battalion, like nearly every other tactical unit, has a triangular organization—three howitzer batteries. Given adequate communications, any one of the three howitzer batteries in the combat team artillery battalion can take over the battalion mission in an emergency. Present artillery gunnery techniques will enable such a battery to gather intelligence, to adjust on enemy locations, and to call for additional artillery, naval gunfire, or close air support.

For the artillery, this potential of the 105mm howitzer battery reduces the danger of too much dependence on the battalion fire direction center. Every so often, of course, the fire direction center will be bombed, shelled, or overrun.

**G**OOD management demands that the infantry regimental commander have a single firepower agent to deal with. Further, that firepower agent must have staff resources—S2, S3, and S4—to match priority of targets with available ammunition and fuel. Then and only then can the regimental commander exercise effective command of supporting guns, ships, and planes. And the man for the firepower mission is the direct support artillery battalion commander, with his staff, communications, observation, survey, liaison, and guns!



# ROADBI



MAJOR JOHN C. FRALISH, Artillery, was S3 of the 38th and 503d Artillery Battalions in Korea and fire support coordinator for the 2d Infantry Division. He is now an instructor in the Department of Gunnery, The Artillery School. He entered the Army in 1942 from the University of Florida and served as liaison officer and battery commander in Europe with the 63d Infantry Division. After the war he was integrated into the Regular Army.

ILLUSTRATED BY W. R. BARKER



# ROCK



*In the bleak mountains of northern Korea two years ago, U. S. forces engaged in a perilous military operation and proved that valor, endurance, discipline, initiative and humor are still the hallmarks of the U. S. soldier.*

## **Major John C. Fralish**

**I** WAS in the Fire Direction Center of the 503d Field Artillery Battalion supervising a fire mission when we were told that the Chinese had established a roadblock astride the 2d Division's MSR (main supply road).

"Oh, well," we thought, "they'll send some tanks and a company of infantry down there and clean up that nuisance in a couple of hours."

That was the morning of 20 November 1950. The Chinese had launched their offensive and had

rolled through the ROKs on the division's right flank. They had hit the 9th Infantry hard, and the 23d and the 38th had felt it, too. But Division thought that the Chinese could be stopped—until it found out that the units on both flanks were withdrawing and that the 2d was surrounded.

The order for a retrograde movement reached the 503d during the night of the 29th. The 9th Infantry was to go ahead, open the road, and hold the shoulders while the rest of the division with-

drew. Then the 23d Regimental Combat Team (which consisted of the 23d Infantry, the 15th Field Artillery Battalion, some tanks, antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons units, and other attachments) was to relieve the 9th and fight the rear-guard action. A British tank unit was to fight north from Suncheon on the MSR until it met 2d Division forces coming south.

All through the night of the 29th, the 503d fired in support of the division units, and caught hostile small arms and mortar rounds occasionally. Throughout the next day the battalion continued to fire—mostly in support of the effort to break the “roadblock.” This obstacle, incidentally, turned out to be a large enemy force dug in on both sides of the road where it wound through a mountain pass about two miles south of our positions.

The 503d sent a forward observer to the site of the roadblock to adjust fire for the units trying to break through. Around noon he returned, explaining that he had been relieved by an observer from another battalion. From then until midafternoon we received no calls for fire on the roadblock.

Apparently our firing did some good, though, because the column moved spasmodically past our positions all day. Now we had word that Division headquarters had passed through, followed by other units, and that Divarty headquarters was beginning to move through too. That meant that soon it would be our turn to close station and hit the road.

**W**E were concerned about what might happen when night came. If we followed the plan outlined in the order, we would start moving through the roadblock area about dark. Several alternate plans were discussed: An Army aviator might fly reconnaissance for another route, and we might plan to destroy all heavy matériel and equipment, if necessary, in order to use that route. Or we could plan to make an infantry battalion out of the one engineer and two field artillery battalions, and fight our way out on foot in case there was no alternate route and the MSR was closed before we got through. Also we might send a reconnaissance party to see if the road through Sinanju was still open. (We didn't know that at that very minute the 23d RCT, which was supposed to be our rear guard, was moving south on that road and was not encountering a single enemy.) Finally, we might destroy our vehicles and everything else that could not be hand-carried and walk out over the hills.

Nothing came of all this discussion—except to follow the Division's plans. I sensed disaster, so prepared to meet it as best I could. I pulled off my new shoe-pacs, put on my oldest, most comfortable combat boots, stuffed my pockets with clean socks, and packed a getaway bag of C rations and small-arms ammo.

Late that afternoon, perhaps 1700 hours, the 38th Field Artillery and the 2d Engineer Battalion rendezvoused next to our position to await their turns to join the column. The order of march placed them behind us. Our battalion commander went over to have a conference with their commanders.

**J**UST at dusk, as the last of the 37th Field Artillery rolled slowly past, we march ordered and joined the column. Within our battalion the order of march was B, Headquarters, C, and A. Behind A Battery came the 38th Field Artillery Battalion. My FDC team had two trucks in the middle of the Hq Btry's column.

We had marched about one and one-half miles when the column halted and did not move again. I radioed the Battalion executive, who was leading the column, but got no answer. I tried calling some of the other stations that I knew were up forward, but received no answer from anyone. Dismounting, I told my men (except drivers) to take up positions on the flanks, while I walked to the head of the column to find out what was holding it up.

In the glow cast by a burning shack beside the road, I met the Hq Btry commander. He had heard my transmissions a few minutes earlier, but could not reply because his jeep's engine had quit on him. He said that B Btry had apparently been attacked from both sides and was almost wiped out. We looked around and found the first sergeant of B Btry and a few men in the last vehicle. I questioned the first sergeant, but he couldn't shed as much light on the situation as did a vehicle burning on the road ahead.

We carefully surveyed the road and the area lighted by the fire of a burning truck, but could neither detect activity nor hear any noise. We decided to try to move. The first sergeant of B Btry moved his vehicle forward, and the whole column began to creep along. We had progressed about twenty or thirty yards when we saw a shadowy figure running up the road toward us, emitting hysterical shrieks and babblings. He was a B Btry aid man.

According to him, the battery had been hit suddenly from both sides of the road. The leading and trailing trac-

tors, towing 155mm howitzers, had been knocked out and the enemy had swarmed over the column, killing or capturing all of the men. The aid man didn't know whether anyone else had escaped. The Chinese had machine guns, captured rocket launchers, mortars, and other weapons dug in on both sides of the road, and there was no sign of any friendly infantry, which was supposed to be holding open the road.

**I**T seemed foolish to go forward. I walked back toward the tail of the column until I found the battalion commander. I briefed him on the situation, and he decided to find the commander of the 38th Artillery Battalion and discuss it with him. The suggestion was made that we destroy our equipment and fight it out as infantry, but the executive officer of the 38th was against this. He requested permission from his CO to put direct fire on the hills on our left flank. Permission was granted, and the 105s of the 38th barked in the darkness.

Someone suggested that we should get the engineers in on the discussions, since they had had experience in fighting as infantry. The CO of the 38th liked this idea, so he instructed his executive and me to go back along the column and try to find the CO of the engineers. We started, but had not gone too far when Chinese mortars dropped a barrage on the road ahead of us. We heard the cough of the first rounds on the way, so we hit the ditch and waited until all of the shells had burst. They were too close for comfort. We decided that it was too late to go searching for the commander of the engineer battalion, since it looked like we would be attacked shortly. Hostile mortars kept firing with growing intensity. Bugle calls pierced the night, and during lulls in the firing we could hear the Chinese laughing and talking in the distance.

The CO of the 38th, my own battalion CO, and I made a reconnaissance to the head of the column to see if there was any hope of getting it in motion.

As we approached the front, we saw a knocked-out vehicle on the right shoulder of the road and one of our trucks halted in the center. We spread out when we reached these vehicles so that the CO of the 38th was in the center between the two vehicles, my CO was on the right side of the road and I was on the left shoulder. The end of a ridge that paralleled the road up to this point turned toward the road; a little beyond was a culvert, and a dry creek bed ran off to our left.



As we stood listening and looking, a machine gun opened up from the culvert, and slugs hit the truck near my head. Several small steel particles imbedded themselves in the bridge of my nose, and a machine-gun bullet grazed my chin and left a burn on it. I hit the dirt, and began crawling back. I met my CO, who said that the CO of the 38th was dead.


As we drew back, we heard digging on the ridge to our right. Thinking they were our own men digging in, I shouted, "Who's digging up there?" No answer. I repeated the question two or three times, but still no answer. Then we knew. The Chinese were no more than fifty yards from us!

**E**NEMY mortar fire was taking a heavy toll. Ammunition vehicles were ablaze up and down the column, and the road was partially blocked in several places. It looked as though we would have to fight it out right here—with the enemy holding the high ground on both sides of the road and the three battalions strung out in a long column.

Bugles blared around us, and we could hear horses neigh and snort. I suggested we fire 155mm howitzers across the column and into the Chinese digging in on the ridge. The battalion commander said OK; that is the last time I saw him.

The C Btry commander put one of his howitzers in position and a lieutenant from A Btry went to the rear to bring up the four AAA automatic weapons. These were two twin 40mm guns on light tank chassis (M-19s) and two quad caliber .50 machine guns on half tracks (M-16s). I sent out several men for local security of the howitzer and began to fire it across the column at the ridge, sighting the piece on enemy positions by boresighting for each round. When we fired the third or fourth round, the enemy replied with a captured rocket launcher. The projectile hit the shield of our piece, damaged the traversing and elevating mechanism, came through the shield, and took off the number one cannoneer's head.

The antitaircraft AW vehicles pulled up. I pointed out an enemy machine gun in a culvert and directed the gunner on the first M-19 to take it under fire. The other AAA AW gunners opened up on enemy positions along the ridge. After the gunner fired on the machine gun in the culvert we approached it cautiously and found six dead Chinese and one old Japanese-type machine gun. Then I saw a body lying on the shoulder of the road, and recognized it as the



*Doughboys of the 2d Infantry Division swarmed aboard a tank during the withdrawal from North Korea in December 1950.*



CO of the 38th. He was still alive. We wrapped him in blankets and I looked around for an ambulance. Ammunition and fuel tanks continued to explode. Safety was not to be found in the vehicles. Surveying the scene, I thought, "No point in trying to avoid being hit." I prayed silently and kept moving.

Not finding an ambulance, I asked several men what had happened to the medics. Someone said that one of the medics had been hit; the others were "somewhere out there" taking care of the wounded. I gave up the search and went back to help put the colonel on one of the other vehicles. The soldier with whom I had left the colonel had already gotten help and had placed him on one of the M-19s.

I walked to the head of the column, which had not moved an inch since I had left. Three or four junior officers had gathered there by now, and I told them to push forward one M-19, then some light vehicles with wounded, then an M-16, some more light vehicles, then the other M-19, and so on until we had everything moving. Riflemen were to protect the flanks.

I urged the driver of the leading M-19 forward, instructing the gunner to return any hostile fire the source of which he could locate. The riflemen had instructions to shoot at whatever targets they could find, and if no targets could be seen, to fire generally toward the ridges and enemy positions. Everyone was to make plenty of noise. We figured that stealth would be impossible (the enemy already knew where we were) and that noise and firing would help our morale.

The leading M-19 moved slowly along the road. At the narrow place across the culvert the road was covered by enemy fire, and a knocked-out vehicle held up the column. A truck was halted a few paces from this point and the driver could not be found. A volunteer jumped in the truck to drive it past the knocked-out vehicle, but a burst of fire from an automatic gun hit him and he slumped in the seat.

For a time after this I remember nothing. I was told later that I mounted the cab of the truck and drove it through the bottleneck. At any rate, we somehow did succeed in neutralizing the hostile fire on this point and got thirty to forty trucks and the four AAA AW vehicles moving south along the road.

During the fierce fighting many individuals performed courageous deeds. The operations sergeant of the 503d (now a battlefield-commissioned lieu-

tenant) neutralized an enemy machine gun by firing at it with his carbine on full automatic from an exposed position so that other soldiers could rescue a number of wounded. Another member of the fire direction center of our battalion took a bazooka and went after two machine guns that were raking the column. He was wounded in the process, but he knocked out the two guns.

Others, whose identities are not known but whose deeds were no less heroic, are now dead or prisoners of the Chinese. There was the work of one soldier from Battery A. A machine gun on the slope of a ridge fifty yards away was raking our vehicles and the men in the ditch with fire. This brave soldier sneaked up through the shadows behind the enemy machine gunner, grabbed the hostile weapon, and swung it at the enemy's head. The flabbergasted Chinese jumped up and disappeared over the ridge amid a hail of bullets from our men who were watching the encounter. But the American soldier never came back.

WE moved at a snail's pace, and it was difficult to keep the vehicles moving—cursing, begging, threatening, and practically pushing them forward by hand at times. When the lead vehicle moved, a few other would follow, but others farther to the rear would get stuck at places where the road was blocked by stalled or overturned trucks, disabled tanks, artillery pieces, or enemy tank traps dug all the way across the road. Sometimes it was necessary for men to pick up a stuck vehicle and shove it back on the road.

We kept the column moving. When I became exhausted, I crawled on the nearest vehicle and rode until I could breathe normally again. The men walking would occasionally spot an abandoned jeep or truck that appeared to be in good condition, and they'd try to get it started. Sometimes they succeeded, and then more could ride.

Though the column drew away from the site of the roadblock it was under constant enemy observation and fire of all types from the high ground on both flanks. The gunners on the AAA vehicles and the riflemen shot back promptly, and we suffered few casualties from the running fight that lasted throughout the next eight miles.

As we rounded a curve in the road, we found ourselves at the top of a hill overlooking a small town. We could see that the enemy held the town in considerable strength, and apparently some friendly forces from the south were fighting for control of the road down

there. The fire fight was raging furiously, with tracers flying in every direction. Soon we were fired on. The men scattered and took cover while the vehicles backed behind an embankment for protection against the hostile fire.

I called the officers together for a brief conference to decide our next move. I had a map, but no flashlight. Someone produced a few matches and a cigarette lighter, and with this primitive illumination we studied a map underneath an overcoat until the light expired. We determined a direction if we had to take to the hills, and announced it to everyone.

This raised the problem of what to do with the wounded who could not walk. The drivers were asked whether they wanted to take these wounded and try a run for it through the town. Most of them wanted to try it, and soon enough drivers agreed to take all of the vehicles through. The walking wounded, about 100 men and three officers, were asked whether they wanted to take the road through town or make a beeline over the hills for Sunchon, which we figured was about ten miles away. (Actually, the distance turned out to be about twenty miles.) The decision finally reached was to send a bodyguard of two officers and a number of men along with the drivers through the town with the seriously wounded. The rest of us would go over the hills to Sunchon.

IT was well past midnight when we started out. We headed east to skirt the town, keeping well up on the slope along the edge of the sparsely wooded top of the hill. We walked as fast as we could through the clear and extremely cold night. Our course was uphill most of the time, and I had to discard my rubber overshoes because they made the going too difficult.

As we hiked along, we could hear the engines of the AAA AW vehicles as they neared the town. When they entered the town, we heard a brief, furious fire fight, and then the engine of only one vehicle as it sped away to the south. The officer who led the vehicle column later described the action which occurred there.

The column reached a bridge across a small stream in the center of the town only to find that the bridge was blocked by an M-16, abandoned earlier when an antitank gun had demolished one of its front wheels. There was a bypass to the left of the bridge, and a handful of soldiers had taken up firing positions in it and around the bridge. They were having a "fine time" as they described

it, fighting off charge after charge by Chinese and North Koreans from the nearby houses. There were Turks, South Koreans, and both white and Negro Americans in this small force. This was the fire fight that we had observed from the hill.

As the leading M-19 headed for the bypass the enemy launched a new charge. One enemy soldier dashed for the turret of the M-16 on the bridge, apparently hoping to turn the quadruple caliber .50 machine guns on U.N. troops. A Negro warrant officer, who later said that he had never before thrown a hand grenade, calmly tossed two grenades into the turret from about 30 yards away, completely disabling the turret and the machine guns. Hostile guns hidden in the surrounding shadows took a heavy toll of our vehicles. Only one finally made it through the bypass. This was the leading M-19, on which the wounded colonel had been wrapped up and tied down so that he would not freeze to death or fall off.

Many men escaped on foot and made their way back to our lines, but most of the wounded who could not walk were either killed or captured.

**T**HE group I was with climbed the hill overlooking the town until suddenly we were taken under fire by what seemed to be caliber .50 machine guns. The fire certainly was not friendly, but we never found out whether it was enemy. It scattered us and some men hit the ground until the firing stopped while others took off rapidly.

The going was extremely rough. The slope was so steep in places that we had to grasp small trees to keep from falling or sliding down the mountain-side. Once we stopped briefly to rest, but the temperature was so low that I soon realized we would freeze if we stopped for long, so I aroused everyone and we started again.

At daylight we were well up into the mountains overlooking the town, and could look down on the activity there. Some enemy soldiers, civilians, horses, and Russian jeeps were all we could see.

We continued our march. About noon we came to a place overlooking the junction of the Taedong River and a smaller stream, about fifteen miles from our destination. Here we halted and discussed the situation. An Air Force AT-6 Mosquito flew over. I pulled off the parka I was wearing, turned the white side out, and waved it to attract the attention of the pilot. The plane flew low, circled and flew away. Later 503d Battalion airplanes came to our aid.

While resting near the river junction we saw troops plodding northwest along a road several thousand yards to the east. They seemed to be wearing American uniforms, but were too far away for us to identify them positively, so we kept out of sight until they disappeared. About an hour later we saw them again, south of the position where we first spotted them. This time we recognized them as Americans, so we hailed them and waited in a small wooded area until they approached.

**T**HE addition of this group gave us a strength of about 200. We organized flank and rear-guard security, appointed a first sergeant, and from then on proceeded across country in a more secure and organized manner. We selected the easiest route in order to save energy and time, and marched with the wounded in the front with the rest of the men following in a column of twos.

Eventually we reached the Taedong River, but there was no way to get across except to wade. Chunks of ice were floating on the water and solid ice lined the banks. Nevertheless we waded hip deep through the cold current fifty yards to the other side. The rocky bottom offered little foothold, and the current almost swept our feet from under us.

When we reached the other side, we found ourselves in a wide, dry rice paddy, with shocks of rice straw all over the field. We built fires and dried our socks, trousers, and boots. While we were do-

ing this, a light airplane circled over us, and I recognized the pilot from the 503d FA. He circled and surveyed the area, apparently searching for a place to land. I made a quick reconnaissance and found that by clearing the large boulders from a bar along the river a field for the plane could be prepared.

We worked furiously, and within minutes the plane landed with two cases of C rations and a five-gallon can of drinking water. The two most seriously wounded men—a ROK and an American—were put aboard the plane, and the pilot took off. We had marched some distance when the other pilot from the 503d FA came over, dropped another case of C rations, and flew cover for us, guiding us along the most favorable route.

About 1700 hours, we reached the Taedong River again. Troops of the 1st Cavalry Division were waiting for us with a boat, and they ferried us across. The wounded were immediately evacuated to medical aid stations by jeeps.

We marched for two or three miles to the outskirts of Sunchon where we were picked up by trucks.

Eventually we were delivered to our own units—or to what was left of them. For days, others who had escaped the trap straggled in singly and by twos and threes. They told of gallant stands made by small bands, overrun by superior numbers after their ammunition was exhausted, or which were wiped out while attacking enemy positions.



*Two months before the Chinese intervention, these 2d Division artillerymen had turned captured Soviet 76mm guns against the enemy in the Naktong Valley.*



# ★ CEREBRATIONS ★

**Our literate cocktail-hour tacticians stand to receive as much as \$10.00 for their contributions to this department. However, the price for those "dashed off" with scant consideration for the rules of composition and rhetoric will be much less. Hold them to four or five hundred words and type them double-spaced.**

## *Clrty or Brvty*

One of our recent manuals, FM 21-30, makes this simple injunction, "Abbreviations should be used only when the meaning is unmistakable and *when the abbreviation will serve a useful purpose*. The unexpected appearance in a message or order of an infrequently used or unfamiliar abbreviation will result in confusion and lost time. Abbreviations are of definite value where a lack of space makes their use necessary or desirable or wherever a considerable saving in time and material will be gained thereby."

Now, in a field order given in a problem used recently at one of our service schools, the following gobbledegook appears: "All mvmt fwd present loc for recon and ln under div ctl."

The manual makes it abundantly clear that abbreviations are to be used with extreme care—indeed, there is an implication that the use of abbreviations should be the exception rather than the rule.

If we glance, however, at the orders issued as models at any (and perhaps all) of our schools, in our garrisons, in administrative orders and practically every place else, we find that it has become mandatory, in actual practice, to use abbreviations.

Further, it has become customary to use abbreviations in conversation and in oral presentations, so that a conference of staff officers not infrequently sounds like—well, I can't think of an apt analogy. (Maybe it is a part of a deep laid plot which is being concocted in the hope that the enemy will become as confused as we are ourselves.)

Shd we hv CIC and ASA invs stf envstns to mke sre tht ths obj is fly achvd?

Field Manual 21-30 includes sixty-seven pages of authorized abbreviations, any or all of which might be used and all of which must be known if the communication in which they are used is to be intelligible to the unfortunate who has to decode and decipher it. He must have either a most phenomenal memory, or must carry a copy of the manual with him at all times.

Of course, abbreviations do save time. Think of the manhours saved by writing "mvmt" instead of "movement," and "coln" instead of "column!" And poor old Colonel A, receiving the message, is deeply grateful because of the time he saves in the instantaneous glance at four letters, instead of having to take in seven letters.

Would it not be appropriate to include in our critiques a comment to the effect, "You used abbreviations in your order unnecessarily. You saved no time and you lost in clarity."

Or, if that is too old-fashioned, then let us, by all means, start indoctrinating all officers in a new language, so that they can understand military English as written. If we must do that, it should be basic that we nvr use fl wds whn abrvtns cn be apld. Strv fr tlq brvty, nt clrty. If our own trps unble undrstd Os, nthr cn enemy.

COL DBLD CLNDNN  
Amr

## *Assault Fire with Grenades*

We all agree, do we not, that the most critical period of an attack on a dug-in enemy is from the time our artillery and mortars lift their supporting fires until the objective is actually overrun by our assaulting troops? If the enemy properly prepares his defensive position to include covered foxholes and weapons emplacements, he will still be manning his individual and crew-served weapons after our fires lift. Even though he is dazed and stunned from the pounding of our heavy stuff, he will be able to fire final protective fires along his main line of resistance. He is definitely in a more favorable position than our men. From positions organized so as to be mutually supporting, he can actually aim his weapons as our attackers advance toward him.

But the attackers, tired by the exertion of the advance from the line of departure to the assault position, have to move in without the help of artillery and mortar fires. The assaulters are exposed and their small-arms fire is relatively ineffective against the covered enemy. Worst of all, when attacking up steep

forward slopes, the assault may have to commence as much as 500 yards from the objective without supporting artillery and mortar fires.

How can we provide more effective assault fires to force the enemy to keep his head down while our assaulting troops approach and overrun his position? Unaimed small-arms fire is not enough. In addition to rifle fire our assaulting troops should shower the enemy position with a rain of small, high-explosive projectiles. We need a weapon that can throw our fragmentation grenades about 500 yards.

It should not be difficult to design a simple, lightweight grenade projector that could propel the grenade a maximum of 500 yards and a minimum of 40 yards. The grenade would need an impact fuze.

With this weapon we would be able to perform the "school solution" for an assault. As soon as the supporting artillery and mortar fires lifted (say when our attacking troops were about 500 yards from their objective), one man from each squad would stop to shower the enemy with grenades from a grenade projector. The rest of the squad would advance, firing assault fire. The grenadier would displace forward to a new firing position as the assaulters moved in. When they were within effective rifle-grenade range of their objective, about 200 yards, they would fire grenades. When they got closer they would throw hand grenades, fire ball ammunition, or use their bayonets.

I hope you combat veterans think that such an assault weapon is worth trying. It could be used for smoke grenades, on patrols, at road blocks, and for local protection of small installations against enemy infiltration, and for protection of vehicles.

One thing is most important: we would have to emphasize the use of the rifle-grenade launcher in our training.

MAJ. GEORGE K. MAERTENS  
Infantry

## *Secret Stab in the Back*

Except in a few fortunate cases, an officer seldom gets the assignment he most ardently desires and when he does, his luck is trebly compounded if he finds himself serving under a good CO. The efficiency reports he can expect from the bad one, or the fairly good but ultraconservative officer, may ruin his career or, at the very least, set back his opportunity for promotion and better assignments for years.

If indeed, "all the brothers were brave and the sisters virtuous," as the



saying goes, quite obviously each officer's efficiency report would be a model of perfection with unfailing justice to the rated officer and all fairness to the military service. The hapless individual with low ratings, if ever he had a chance to get in calling distance of the Adjutant General's Office in the Pentagon, could drop in and make a careful study of his weak points, knowing that they were such, and profit by his visit.

We all have faith in an honest appraisal of an officer's performance of duty and there can be no quarrel with such. But this piece is aimed directly at the system that permits, without question or without reference to the rated officer, an efficiency report to be placed upon his record that is unfair and which cannot fail to injure his military career.

Let's get down to cases: First of all we have the irascible, erratic type of superior officer. Usually he has been around for a long time and his failure to attain higher rank has so soured and embittered him that he sees no good in anyone and makes life hell on earth for his subordinates who plainly detest old "Snarl 'n' Snort" but do the best they can while praying for a speedy release. To request a transfer from such unhappy climes invariably brings down the wrath of the Great Man and all of his vassals. He knows that practically no one serves him willingly and he'll block such a request even while venting his venom on the man who dares attempt such a thing.

In the fullness of time, reassignment orders come through and you leave, breathing a sigh of relief and saying with feeble assurance, "Well, maybe the old hellion isn't as blackhearted as he seems. Maybe he'll be decent about my OER." You're an optimist, if you do. The odds are better than even that you will have been knifed neatly in the back, no matter how cordial your formal farewell may have been.

If, on the other hand, the old gentleman's pettiness and arrogance finally catch up with him and he is relieved, then, in the fullness of his unbounded fury, he will make a Roman holiday out of the OERs of his junior associates in the mistaken theory that every last one of them is to blame for his predicament. Believe me, these things do happen. And there ain't no recourse. The AG will uphold the old gentleman at least ninety-nine times out of the proverbial hundred. That is, of course, if you get around to see the report in time to raise a point of self-defense. Quantities of evidence are needed to prove either "personal prejudice or insanity." In your

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own mind, there is no doubt of one or the other, or perhaps both, and you may be able to round up copious letters from parties who agree that you have had a raw deal. But short of a miracle, the cold figures of the Overall Efficiency Index will continue to stare you right in the face. They also stare into the faces of various promotion and other evaluation boards. At any rate you need a long string of straight superiors to overcome that one, friend.

Having recovered from the horrors of such an assignment you take a spot of leave but cut it short, being eager to take on the new detail and hoping for the best. This time you hit the jackpot. A good assignment with swell people. A happy deal all around and, what is more important, a chance to redeem yourself on the record and in your own esteem. That is wonderful as far as it goes, but let's look a little closer. Colonel "Good Joe" is just that. A considerate gentleman of the old school. It's a pleasure to work your heart out for him and an honor to serve under him. But what you don't know and never will find out unless you make it a point to visit the Pentagon at a later date, Colonel Good Joe still lives in the Old Army where efficiency ratings were either "satisfactory" or "unsatisfactory." Since the Colonel in all decency and charm will gladly pin a medal on you as a result of a fine bit of combat action, he feels that "very satisfactory" is a mighty good rating and no man is superior. So even if you see his report on you at a later date, there really isn't any comeback. The man is and was honest as the day is long. Much too conservative, however, to bring you up from one of the lower thirds.

That tour wasn't wasted. Hell no. You enjoyed the duty. You learned a lot, too, and you never had better quarters on any post. Of course, if you're about due to go to school at Leavenworth you'd better forget it. Career Management will tell you quite frankly that your OEI isn't quite high enough for that. Better luck next time!

If such a thing were possible, Colonel "Top Notch" should be required to hang a sign on himself saying, "Come on over and join a good outfit, lads, I'll work your pants off, but if you produce, the rewards are great!" Such a one should have been a general long ago. He'll make it too, if the lucky chaps who have served with him can help by singing his praises. With him, your efficiency report will not be anything less than it should be, probably somewhat better, and there will likely be a commendation or two in the 201 file as well. Where is Colonel "Top Notch" these days? We know he exists. Thousands would beat a path to the foremost foxhole in Korea to serve with him.

Since none of us can hope to choose Colonel "Top Notch," even fairly often, we're all in constant danger of running afoul of old "Snarl 'n' Snort" or perchance an agreeable, but largely personally unprofitable tour with Colonel "Good Joe." But can't the system be altered just a little to take the curse off the "super secret stab in the back"?

The rated officer should be shown every ER rendered on him and be required to sign a statement to accompany the form to the effect that "I have read the foregoing ER and have no [or the following] comment to make." Then, and then only, should the report be forwarded to the indorsing officer for his action and if the ER is obviously damaging to the rated officer the indorser should make his own investigation before indorsing it forward. In this way, "Snarl 'n' Snort" would be careful to be able to justify every bit of his nastiness, and "Good Joe" might have it gently pointed out that times have changed and did he actually intend to seriously damage the career of a good or better-than-average officer?

For those who have been unjustly rated, any past OER reasonably subject to question should be submitted to the rated officer for suitable comment. Then an honest reappraisal should be made in fairness to the officer himself. Without this, such reports should be disregarded and the system reformed to permit comment by the rated officer prior to indorsement as suggested above.

ONE WHO'S HAD IT!

# FRONT and CENTER

## Rotation & Promotion

Mrs. Anna Rosenberg returned from Korea and announced that every effort would be made in the Far East Command to maintain the present rotation point system. It will be difficult in view of the Army's manpower problems but if the present crisis is weathered it is possible that by early spring the outlook will be brighter.

Promotions of both officers and enlisted men are retarded by lack of money. Partly this is because the Congress has never faced up to the continuation of the Korean Conflict and has based all appropriations and authorizations on the supposition that the conflict would not drag on as it has.

Mrs. Rosenberg said that many enlisted men and junior officers in Korea are performing jobs calling for higher ratings. One suggestion for overcoming this was to authorize temporary promotions for Korean service only. Promotion would be for a specific job and the man getting it would revert to his former rank when he left that job.

In Washington it was revealed that Pentagon planners are giving thought to a fair promotion policy for officers and men who are prisoners of war in Communist hands. This is an admittedly difficult problem that was never satisfactorily solved during or after the Second World War.

The promotion crisis is not solely an Army one. Other services are unhappy too. Both the Navy and Air Force have been harder hit by the Davis Rider.

## Chemical Weapons Battalion

Transfer of the 4.2-inch mortar to infantry outfits doesn't mean that the Chemical Corps will be deprived of combat battalions, Maj. Gen. E. F. Bullene, Chief Chemical Officer, told his Corps in a statement that lauded it for giving the Army "a fine weapon."

The 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion will be reactivated as the 2d Chemical Weapons Battalion and "will be a unit specifically designed, equipped, and manned to the needs of our tactical mission," Gen. Bullene said. He didn't reveal what weapons the Battalion would have or when the reactivation would take place.

## Qualification Tests Revised

An improved series of Armed Forces Qualification Tests to be used in determining the acceptability of men for enlistment or induction into the Armed Services have been adopted.

The new tests are designed to measure more accurately the level of mental ability of prospective entrants into service. Known as AFQT 3 and AFQT 4, they will go into effect in January, 1953, and will replace AFQT 1 and 2, which have been in use since 1950.

Introduction of the improved tests does not change the level of mental ability necessary for enlistment or induction.

AFQT 3 and 4 are part of a plan to install new test forms periodically, the Army said. This insures that test contents do not become common knowledge, and permits changes based on the constant and extensive research which is being done on problems involved in selecting personnel for the Armed Services.

The new tests are based on a great number of test questions which were tried out on a representative group of men.

One important addition to the revised test forms is a group of questions relating to the many jobs in military service which involve mechanical skills. The new questions measure basic mechanical ability associated with tools used in mechanical jobs. They will facilitate selection of men who are best qualified for jobs requiring mechanical ability.

## THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

### 280 Gun Arrives

The Army's largest mobile artillery piece, the 280mm gun which can fire an atomic projectile, has been shipped to Fort Sill and assigned to Battery A, 867th Field Artillery Battalion. Up to now the gun has been in the hands of Ordnance technicians and was fired for the public at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., early this fall.

News reports have hinted that the gun

will be test-fired with the atomic projectile in Nevada before very long. No official announcement of this has been made, nor is one likely, at least until after the test is completed.

## Infantry Exercise

The Artillery School has prepared a map exercise (CA-831.4), *The Reinforced Rifle Company in the Attack*, to familiarize artillery unit commanders, officers, and men with infantry's tactical methods and problems. This exercise, which is presented by lecture, conference, practical work, and demonstration, was developed to emphasize coordination between infantry and artillery and to help artillery units give effective support to infantry.

The problem is based on the tactical situation used in TF 7-1521, *Rifle Company in the Attack*. Students are given first a short review of the principles of attack and the organization of the rifle company. They are then required to plan an attack for a rifle company, emphasizing troop leading, coordination of fires, use of tank-infantry teams and coordination with engineers, and reorganization and consolidation of the company objective. Complete and intelligent fire planning prior to the attack is emphasized.

After the attack plans are finished and discussed, the students are shown TF 7-1521, which pictures a rifle company actually attacking over the same terrain, under the same conditions, and against the same enemy used by the students in making their plans. The film illustrates how the company commander maintains communications, controls his platoons, and influences the action by shifting and massing his supporting fires.

An efficient and inexpensive method of instruction, this exercise can easily be modified to meet the requirements of different training programs and to conform with the military background of students. It is presented to the advanced class, and has been recommended to be included in all TAS programs of instruction.

## New Theodolite

The new Universal Theodolite Wild T-2 is being introduced to students in three courses with twelve hours of classroom and practical instruction scheduled. The Wild T-2 Theodolite is a fully-inclosed, optically-read, directional instrument of Swiss manufacture that can be read to one second and interpolated to 1/10 second. It has been approved as the interim instrument to replace the 20-second transit in the Field Artillery Observation battalion, and is easier to read than the transit. The Wild T-2 has been recommended for issue to headquarters and headquarters batteries of division artillery and to heavy and very heavy field artillery battalions.

## Helicopter Ambulances

The Department of Air Training is training Army Medical Service officers in



ROTC cadets of the Siena College Field Artillery unit raised the money and built this shrine to the patron saint of artillerymen on the campus of the college at Loudonville, N. Y. The entire cadet battalion attended the dedication ceremonies conducted by the Rev. Thomas J. Giblin, OFM, and Lt. Col. William Law, PMS&T at Siena. Capt. Angelo Cicciu, assistant PMS&T, was chairman of the fund-raising and building campaign.

basic aviation and helicopter operations to provide pilots for the new Helicopter Ambulance units. These units, organized as an integral part of the AMS in theaters of operation, evacuate wounded soldiers from forward combat areas. There are nine AMS officers attending the current 19-week Helicopter Transport Pilot course.

The first Helicopter Ambulance unit was activated at the Medical Field Service School, Fort Sam Houston, where it is used for training purposes. Additional units will be formed when trained men and equipment become available.

### Army Aviation Film

A film on Army aviation, photographed in three parts at TAS by the Signal Corps, covers the training of Army aviators and features the many missions assigned to Army aircraft, including the conduct of fire, column control, camouflage inspection, evacuation of casualties, rescue, supply, wire-laying, message drop and pick-up, and radio relay.

### Heliport

The Department of Air Training has opened a heliport on what was once a hard-surfaced truck park. The pavement has been marked for take-off, landing, and hovering lanes. A maintenance building and a windsock were obtained and the heliport was in business.

The heliport is the forerunner of the Army's first airport specifically designed for helicopters. It will be built early in 1953 at Fort Eustis, Va. There the Transportation Corps will conduct training in helicopter operations. The proposed heliport will have a control tower, administration building, hangar, warehouse, night lighting, and fuel storage facilities.

### Calibration Range

The Artillery School has installed a permanent calibration range to be used to determine corrections for gunnery research projects. It consists of two poles spaced fifty feet apart with a hoop-shaped magnetic coil mounted on each pole. The artillery weapon to be calibrated is sighted so that a magnetized projectile can be fired through both hoops. A chronograph measures the time required for the shell to pass through both hoops. From this time interval, the actual muzzle velocity of the weapon can be determined. For field artillery weapons, figures obtained are accurate to within two feet per second.

## THE INFANTRY SCHOOL

### Tank Maintenance

A 31-hour course in the maintenance and operation of tanks, discontinued in 1950 because of personnel and equipment shortages, has returned to the curriculum of The Infantry School.

Five M46 medium tanks will be used in the shop maintenance and familiarization

### Infantry School Instructional Material

The following new instructional material suitable for non-resident as well as resident instruction may be ordered from the **Book Department, The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.**, at the prices shown. (The COMBAT FORCES Book Service regrets that it cannot handle orders for these pamphlets.)

#### WEAPONS DEPARTMENT

**Marksmanship, Preparatory Training, Carbine M2: No. 1126.** Sighting and aiming; Positions; trigger squeeze; sustained fire; sight changes, effect of wind, etc; examination prior to range firing. 4 hours. 6¢

**Technique of Rifle Fire: No. 1265.** Field target firing. Introduction to field targets to include squad control, issuance of orders, distribution of fire, teamwork, target control, and firing limits. Practical work in field target firing. 4 hours. 10¢

**Sniperscope Firing: No. 1280N.** Familiarization firing with sniperscope. Concurrent training in use of binoculars at night. Use of magscope. 3 hours. 10¢

**Night Vision: No. 1282.** Introduction and background of night vision. Discussion of extensive research performed in night vision. Four principles of night vision. Practical work with shadowgraph. Use of red goggles in dark adaptation, use of red light in dark adaptation and its effect on colors. Discussion of training aids. 2 hours. 10¢

**Mechanical Training, 81mm Mortar: No. 1601.** Organization: weapon characteristics; description and functioning; ammunition; nomenclature; mounting and dismounting; assembly and disassembly; firing tables; fire commands; sight; sight setting and laying. 4 hours. 10¢

**Table II—Qualification Firing Course "C" 57mm Rifle: No. 1759.** Explanation of Table II. Course "C." Practical work in firing the course. 4 hours. 10¢

#### STAFF DEPARTMENT

**Map Reading: No. 6680.** Marginal information; conventional signs; military symbols, grid and thrust lines; geographic coordinates; scale; relief and topography used in map reading. 2 hours. 80¢

phase and five M47 medium tanks are to be used for the field maintenance and driving instruction. Students in the Motor Transportation Course, Unit Automotive Supervision Course, and the Infantry Officer Advanced Course will receive this instruction.

### Swing Landing Trainer

A swing landing trainer has been developed for use in teaching airborne students proper parachute landing techniques.

The trainer is a platform 14 feet high with steps at each end. A large wooden overhead frame extending several feet away from each side covers the platform. Four parachute harnesses are suspended (by a block and tackle arrangement) from each of two sides of the frame so that a total of eight students can be trained at one time. Each student is buckled into the harness at his training station on the platform; at a signal he jumps over the side and swings back and forth under the frame just as he would under a canopy in a normal parachute descent. An assistant instructor at the block and tackle control lowers the student slowly until the student is four or five feet from the ground, then trips a lever which causes the suspension system to go slack, dropping the student to the ground.

### Rifle Marksmanship

As a means of giving the coach added incentive to train his pupil more closely during rifle marksmanship training, The Infantry School has adopted a "buddy" system that allows the coach to add extra points to his score if his pupil qualifies.

A coach whose pupil qualifies as expert gets 10 points added to his score. If the pupil qualifies as sharpshooter, the coach gains seven points; for a firer's qualification of marksman, the coach gets three points. No deduction is made if the pupil fails to qualify.

### Model Foxholes

The Infantry School is using "cutaway" foxholes as training aids in field fortifications training. The new positions are built into the side of a defile so that the students can get a clear, unobstructed view into the holes. Previously, students could only peer down into holes or look at stakes driven into the ground to represent positions.

Viewed from the other side, the foxholes appear just as they would to an enemy.

In addition to regular two-man foxholes, rocket launcher and machine gun positions and bunkers have been constructed.

### Field Fortifications

Realistic field fortifications for a platoon in the defense have been constructed in the Davis Hill area of the Fort Benning reservation. The positions are actual size and are made of logs, sandbags, and old crates. Tunnels connect the bunkers and trenches and the entire position is completely camouflaged.



# Irons in the Fire



First turbine-powered light plane

## Turboprop "Bird Dog"

The light Army-used Cessna XL-19B, powered by the new Boeing 502-B gas turbine, has been under test for over two months at Cessna's Wichita plant. Minor modifications to the engine mounts and cowlings were necessary in order to install the turbine, and additional internal air intake ducts and a new oil radiator support had to be added. If further tests indicate its full acceptance, it would provide the Army with a plane with a power plant 125 lbs. lighter; with cooling problems eliminated and with vibration almost nonexistent. The engine uses almost no oil and has eliminated the need for fuel mixture control, carburetor and the attendant carburetor heat control system. Another very practical advantage of the new engine is the fact that it will operate on diesel fuel, any grade of automotive fuel, high octane gas, or jet fuel.

## Aeroplast

The Air Force-developed "spray on" plastic surgical dressing excites military medical officers. Originally developed for possible emergency use in the event of atomic attack, it appears now that it may be effective in treating many types of surgical wounds. The transparent plastic dressing is applied directly to the burned or injured areas of the body from an aerosol-type pressurized container and provides instant protection. Tests so far indicate that gauze bandages are not needed when the "aeroplast" is used. "Aeroplast" has many advantages over gauze dressings, including time-saving application, transparency to permit easy inspection of the wound, and ease in removing or changing the dressing, and it can be applied to parts of the body poorly adapted for gauze dressings.

## Panoramic Photography

Though usually associated with motion pictures, panoramic photographs of the "still" variety are proving a useful intelligence medium in Korea. Used in conjunction with terrain maps and sometimes aerial photos, these panoramic photos have proved of great help in identifying terrain features. Artillery fire-direction centers, tank commanders and forward observers have all found target and terrain identification easier with panoramic photographs. They are useful too in briefing patrols and new officers, and by using "before and after" shots, better evaluation of firing results can be made. For best results a point of good observation anywhere from 500 to 1500 yards from the front lines can be selected. A Speed Graphic camera on a tripod, with a F/4.7, 127mm lens, is used. Pictures of an entire regimental front may be taken allowing about a 25% overlap on each picture. After printing and enlarging, the photos are then cut and pasted to form a complete mosaic of the area.



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. . . as a wall phone.

## All-In-One Telephone

A combination wall-desk telephone, called the "all-in-one," has been designed by the Connecticut Telephone and Electric Corp. The phone is actually a universal local-battery telephone which can be converted to a manual common-battery phone without adding either electrical or mechanical parts. It can also be converted quickly to a common-battery dial phone merely by the addition of a dial and dial bracket. It can be used on either wall or desk without modification. Built to meet military specifications, the new phone can withstand unusual abuse and climatic conditions and features a new hook-switch consisting of two sensitive enclosed switches thoroughly sealed from dust and dirt. All parts of the phone may be removed or interchanged with no other tool than a screwdriver, enabling quick repair and maintenance.

## Guided Missile Group

The 1st Guided Missile Group, formed in April 1950, has three battalions engaged in testing and developing missiles and in training AAA soldiers in missile operations and tactics. The 1st GM Battalion, parent of the Group, is at White Sands, N. M., and engaged in development work with civilian engineers and scientists. The 2d and 3d GM Battalions work with specific tactical missiles, including firing operations. There are three types of guided-missile specialists trained by the Group: (1) fire control crewmen who operate the ground guidance equipment and perform duties similar to a radar operator; (2) matériel crewmen who help assemble, test and maintain missiles; and (3) launching chiefs and specialists who perform various duties in launching areas.



Humidity Indicator

## Cocoon Sleuth


A handy humidity indicator, capable of detecting a spoonful of water in an average-sized living room, has been developed by the Minneapolis-Honeywell Company and the Department of Defense. The unusually sensitive electronic device was designed to safeguard stored military equipment from rust and corrosion. A sensing element is placed inside the cocoon at the time of storage and an electron meter can then be plugged in through a connection to determine the humidity within the cocoon.

## Tank Modification Plant

A tank modification plant will be built at Newark, Del., at a cost of \$3,100,000. It will be operated by the Chrysler Corporation and will be a part of the Chrysler Delaware Tank plant. The Army anticipates that it will be in initial operation by 1 April 1953, and in full operation by 1 July 1953. The new plant will be used for making final installation of on-vehicle-equipment and any modifications which may be required on all tanks produced in the Delaware Tank plant. It will employ 400 persons.

## P2V-6 Neptune

Lockheed Corp. has the P2V-6 Neptune under flight test. This new Navy plane is designed for mine-laying and anti-submarine warfare. It is powered by two turbo-compound engines built by Wright. Among new features is pressure fueling for fast-feeding fuel into the wing tanks to save time in combat; a companion feature provides rapid emptying of tanks in hazardous situations; stainless steel engine nacelles have high fire resistance.



Heavy crane rolls up ramp of new BARC

## 60-ton Amphibious Vehicle

The "BARC," a huge 60-ton, amphibious cargo vehicle which travels on 10-foot high tires, was unveiled at Fort Lawton, Wash. It is designed to perform tasks ashore and afloat far outranging other amphibious vehicles. The amphibious BARC can take heavy loads from shipside in deep water, across a beach and over rough terrain to an inland supply point for direct discharge, or for transfer to truck or rail. This largely eliminates difficult and inefficient re-handling of cargo at the waterline. The vehicle was developed by the Transportation Corps with consultant advice by Richard C. Kerr, technical consultant of the Arabian American Oil Company, and Roderick Stephens, of Sparkman and Stephens, Inc., both of New York City.

The BARC is 61 feet long, 27½ feet wide, and 16 feet high. One operator can handle it both on land and in the water. Its basic crew is three men.

Each of the four wheels is separately powered by an individual 165 horsepower industrial Diesel engine driving through a torque converter and torqmatic transmission. The transmission has three forward speeds and one reverse, with a land speed up to 15 miles per hour. Steering on land is by hydraulic control and power. The driver may steer by front wheels only, leaving the rear wheels locked in a straight position, or use front and rear wheel action simultaneously for sharp turns. He can also set the wheels for "crab" steering to either side. Afloat, it is propelled by twin screw propellers, each powered by two of the four engines. By reversing propellers, one forward and the other reverse, the BARC can "spin" in a relatively tight circle for quick maneuvering.

To facilitate the discharge of cargo, the BARC is equipped with an hydraulically operated bow ramp. In addition, there is a stern winch also driven through a power-take-off, which has a line-pull capacity of fifty thousand pounds.



Navy's Neptune

# ★ BOOK REVIEWS ★

## LINCOLN THE STATESMAN

**LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT: MIDSTREAM.** By J. G. Randall. Dodd, Mead & Co. 467 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$7.50.

During the Civil War, President Lincoln concentrated with equal intensity on the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and on the more difficult and subtle task of winning men's minds. This is made abundantly clear in the third volume of Mr. Randall's monumental and scholarly study of Lincoln's Presidency. In this volume the emphasis is on Lincoln, the statesman, rather than Lincoln, the commander-in-chief. The events of 1863 are stressed, but Mr. Randall's reflections on the interplay of biography and history, of the action and reaction of Lincoln's personality and character with the human and international environment are by no means confined to that year.

Copperheads and many members of Congress were venomous opponents of Lincoln's efforts in this country's first total mobilization. The war powers of the President were under constant scrutiny and debate. In consequence the President's difficulties with Capitol Hill were disturbing and depressing. "When in addition to all this," writes Mr. Randall, "it is remembered that the President got little comfort and much interference from his Cabinet, that his generals were often a trial to him, and that few of the state governors were genuinely enthusiastic for him, one can understand Lincoln's loneliness in his lofty office."

If to these tribulations had been added the unhappy marriage that many earlier biographers have pictured, Lincoln's chances of survival would have been small indeed. Mr. Randall's well documented chapter on the "lonely White House pair" puts an end to this canard. He is evidently justified in concluding that the Lincolns were "a loving and thoroughly devoted couple" and that Mary Todd Lincoln and their sons were a never-failing solace to the President. Lincoln's "gift of laughter," to which a most illuminating chapter is devoted, was also consoling in a time of trouble.

Another myth that gives way to careful analysis of historical evidence is the usual belief that Britain was hostile to the North during the Civil War. Mr. Randall offers proof that the British people and government were fundamentally friendly to Lincoln and to his cause, and Lincoln's policies, both foreign and domestic, decidedly influenced this conciliatory attitude.

Of military activities there is comparatively little in this volume, other than the campaign in eastern Tennessee in 1863. This led to Grant's assignment to the supreme command in the West. Evidence is lacking, according to Mr. Randall, to prove that Lincoln personally made this decision.

"Lincoln did not at this time 'find' Grant, though he felt and expressed high regard for him and found his uncomplaining letters, and his lack of a personal axe to grind, refreshing in contrast to other military leaders."

Mr. Randall's life of Lincoln the President admirably fulfills William Faulkner's comment that it is the writer's "privilege to help man endure by lifting his heart, by reminding him of the courage and honor and hope and pride and compassion and pity and sacrifice which have been the glory of his past." These climactic years of Lincoln's life have all these qualities and Mr. Randall makes the most of them with simplicity and without exaggeration.—BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD ARMSTRONG.

## LINCOLN THE MAN

**ABRAHAM LINCOLN.** By Benjamin P. Thomas. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 548 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.45.

Abraham Lincoln was, by any standards, one of the most complex, many-sided men ever to achieve high political office in the United States or the world. This gaunt man was no simple son of the soil, no saint with a holy purpose to free the slaves, no brooding figure in a magnificent memorial in Washington. Abraham Lincoln was a living, breathing man—a man who had a deep vein of humor in him, a man who worried to the point of hypochondria, a man who had family troubles, a man who saw something about the United States that it has been given few men to see, a man who was determined that this country should be saved no matter what else was destroyed in the saving.

Lincoln had an enormous capacity for learning, and grew in wisdom and knowledge as he grew in years. He was a statesman in the broadest and finest sense of the word. But Lincoln was also a practical politician whose skill was unequaled in the White House until the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt nearly seventy-five years later.

These are the things our young people seldom learn about Abraham Lincoln in their studies, but the student, young or old, who does not understand them does not understand Lincoln or his times.

Benjamin P. Thomas has been a Lincoln scholar all his adult life, and this book shows clearly that many years of patient digging for facts and more facts can, if the seeker for facts is capable of understanding them, result in a splendid work of literature.

Many have felt that everything has been said about Lincoln that could possibly be said. But Mr. Thomas has presented new material about Lincoln, both from the Robert Todd Lincoln collection and from the documents gathered for the preparation of the *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*.

The important thing Mr. Thomas has done, although his new material will undoubtedly please Lincoln experts, is to re-evaluate the man in terms of our time as well as his own. Lincoln was a legend before he was murdered, but he was not a universally loved or even universally respected man. It has been only in recent years that we have understood what Lincoln was trying to accomplish, the ultimate purpose of all his policies. In Mr. Thomas' words: "But only with the slow march of time would it be given to most of his countrymen to understand the supreme meaning of his life. Only with that national soul-searching which is born of trial and challenge would they begin to share his vision of man's vast future, and to know their proper part in shaping it."

"Because to him the American people were the leaders of an awakening of plain people the world over . . . Lincoln saw his countrymen as inheritors of a trust. To them it had been given to make democracy succeed, to cleanse it 'of the hypocrisies that deprive it of its just example in the world.' For in democracy, made genuine, he saw our 'last best hope' of frustrating any tyrant who seeks to regiment or debase or mislead any people, anywhere . . ."

This was the meaning behind the emancipation of the slaves, behind the great speeches, poetic in their feeling for humanity, austere in logic. This was the meaning behind nearly every act of Lincoln's later years. This was what his boyhood, his years of legal practice had taught him. This was the great belief that carried him through the terrible years of the war, that strengthened his resolve that the Union should not be destroyed.

Here, then, is Mr. Thomas' view of Abraham Lincoln, the whole man, and it is a superlatively good one—a balanced appreciation of Lincoln's private and public life, his stature as a statesman and as a military strategist. It is accurate, eminently readable, and soundly reasoned. The trivial and the apocryphal have been eliminated. Mr. Thomas has given us a biography that is likely to be the standard one-volume work on Lincoln for the rest of this century, and perhaps longer.—O. C. S.

## THE LOYALTIES OF SOLDIERS

**SWORD AND SWASTIKA: Generals and Nazis in the Third Reich.** By Telford Taylor. Simon and Schuster. 445 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$5.00.

A historical study of the German officers' corps may well seem to be a dull and academic matter of little current interest. But actually, Brig. Gen. Telford Taylor, who was an Army intelligence officer in Europe during World War II and later the prosecution counsel at the Nuremberg war crimes trials, has created the stimulating basis for deep thought on two questions which are certainly current and which might well become vital in the not distant future.

What were the potentialities of the Ger-

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man officers' corps which survived and prospered after the defeats of the Napoleonic wars and of World War I?

What are the political and moral responsibilities of military men?

The first question cannot be answered intelligently without an understanding of the history and traditions of the German officers' corps. The second is not as definitely settled in America as many military men have believed. General Taylor quotes General MacArthur as saying in one of his speeches: "I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance or loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch of Government rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend. No proposition could be more dangerous."

Apart from these two questions, this book has further value because of the far-reaching effect of the decisions of the German military leaders when, during pre-World War II days, they faced the problem of to whom they owed allegiance. As General Taylor says, "The alliance of the German military leaders with those of Nazi totalitarianism sealed the fate of Germany, cast the die for war, and turned the course of history." He adds that this alliance "was the direct cause of the desolation and devitalization of Europe and a major determinant of the international crisis we face today."

General Taylor focuses his attention on the period between the Versailles treaty—"In 1918, the officers' corps was left with nothing it thought worthy of loyalty except itself"—and the invasion of Poland, but he covers the whole history of the corps from the days when it was the exclusive province of royalty and the nobility. As he says: "... several Prussian noble families were becoming army stud-farms bearing names all too familiar today. Even before the turn of the century there had been fourteen generals von Kleist and ten generals von der Goltz."

He sums up the corps' history in this paragraph: "Originally recruited from the eighteenth-century Junker nobility of Prussia, the corps took shape and rose to fame under Frederick the Great. Discredited by abysmal defeat at the hands of Napoleon, the corps was rehabilitated early in the nineteenth century by a remarkable group of leaders known to history as the 'Reformers' (Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Clausewitz and others), and won back its prestige with the ultimate downfall of Napoleon, in which the Prussian armies under Blücher played a vital part. After another period of stagnation, the corps rose to the zenith of its glory during the second half of the nineteenth century under the leadership of the renowned von Moltke and von Schlieffen. Victorious in three wars against Denmark, Austria and France during less than a decade, the military leaders shared with Bismarck the popular acclaim for bringing the German Empire

## Off-Duty Reading

### Who Put the Benzadrine in Herodotus's Ovaltine?

THE writing of military history has come to a point where there is a basic conflict between the people who would have us write military (or any other) history for its own sake, and the "do it today" school of thought.

The exponents of definitive history believe that the events of the past—if accurately researched, clearly written and correctly interpreted—will be absorbed into the body of military doctrine by a sort of osmosis. This, they believe, is the proper function of military history. The historian, they hold, must not have his research cut short, his judgment clouded by a sense of urgency, by someone peering over his shoulder and saying: "Quick, what went wrong with this action? How do we have to change our doctrine to prevent the same mistake in another war?"

Considering that only in the last few years have we gotten the Civil War correctly assessed (and there are still many who will take violent issue with *that* statement), there can surely be no quarrel with the calm, dispassionate view of military history.

But there is. The quarrel is that we no longer have 25 or 50 years between wars (assuming that we used this time to learn). We are lucky now if we have five years between wars, and we need to have the lessons written for us almost before the guns have cooled. And so the pressure goes on for monographs and studies of special actions, special phases of war for immediate delivery to the planners and the people charged with training.

Some historians say that this is not history. Some say that it is history, though not definitive history. Both agree that there is a need for it, but nobody agrees on who should do it—whether it should be a historical function, or a function of Operations Research or some similar agency.

AND so we have one group of historians writing the many-volumed history of World War II which, we suspect, nobody will have time to read from end to end and for which no master index will be available for some years. We have another group collecting current material from Korea for the preparation of studies on special aspects of the war. (Some of this material has recently appeared in these pages.) Other men are in the field, collecting information, conducting interviews. Command reports flow in from Korea, some of them informative, many of them suspect.

Military history, in other words, is a complex, far-flung operation, but still the stepchild of the United States Army. Some commanders are conscious of the need for military history, but many mistrust it and its motives, brush off historians attached to their commands or try to use them as PIOs and writers of citations. Some historians, we must admit, deserve this treatment, but many are competent men who deserve a commander's time and confidence.

But the Office of the Chief of Military History has not enough money or enough people to be all things to all men. The history of World War II is going forward and, although the volumes are uneven in quality of writing, they constitute so far a magnificent achievement—an achievement that will be of enduring value, perhaps of more value in 25 years than they are now.

We believe good material will come out of Korea, but it has not appeared yet, largely because the program was slow to start and because no one seems to have been quite sure what the program ought to be.

In the meantime, day by day, G3 or G2 wants information on this problem or that problem—a special study on a special aspect of World War II that is applicable to Korea or to some problem that may come up in the future. And there are not enough people to dig the information out unless something else is put aside and delayed.

We believe that all of these things are in the field of interest of military history. We believe it is time to recognize the fact that military history—in all of its phases—is vital to the life of the United States Army. We are not going to throw away all of our past experience no matter how atomic another war may become. We believe the historical program ought to be put on a basis where it can deliver information to meet current needs without interrupting its long-range program of narrative history. The historical program has given us magnificent work (the volume reviewed elsewhere in this issue is a splendid example), but we cannot help but believe that it is not yet fully accepted by responsible senior officers, and until it is, we are in danger of losing the bright, clear light that the past can shine upon the present.—O. C. S.

into existence and raising it to the status of a major world power. The dominating stature of the officers' corps in Germany after the Franco-Prussian War carried it through the ensuing seventy years and enabled it to survive defeat in the First World War. Even the utter disaster of 1945 has not entirely destroyed the prestige of the corps, and it would be reckless indeed to assume lightly that it has no future."

Never has Hitler's "malignant but phenomenal political genius" been established with more clarity than in this book, and the account of the development of his dominance over Germany's military leaders is well written and well documented. It may be that the author has treated the officers' corps too much as though it were a legislature or a jury organized to consider political and moral questions and take votes on them. Indeed, he seems to use "officers' corps," "the generals," and "the commanding generals" interchangeably. And in discussing the period of the Polish and western campaigns and the initial attack on Russia, he says: "This critical moment in German history found men at the top of the rank list who were to be sure, ambitious, energetic and skilled in military science, but whose other faculties were either still-born or atrophied from disuse." With their country involved in war, may these leaders not have had "other faculties" which they were still capable of using but which they felt honor-bound not to use?

The whole question of the political and moral responsibilities of military men is as important to American soldiers, sailors, and airmen as it was to the German generals. The American officer takes his oath to "support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies foreign or domestic," but his commission says that he is to observe and follow such orders and directions as he shall receive from the President or future President or officers "set over him."

In commenting on the previously quoted statement of General MacArthur, General Taylor says that it "raised by clear implication the idea that an officer's duty of obedience to 'those who temporarily exercise the authority of the Executive Branch' (by which he can only mean the President, who is the Constitutional Commander-in-Chief, just as were the German Presidents in Seeckt's time) is qualified by an overriding obligation to defend the Constitution."

In a final chapter on "The Responsibility of the Officers' Corps" Taylor discusses this and related questions extensively in the case of the Germans, and more briefly and less explicitly as a general problem. He points out that the adjective "military" has long since lost its purity, and that it is quite impossible for generals to analyze military problems without the analysis carrying a direct impact on political and diplomatic issues. He believes that there is a "sound public attitude that military leaders should enter these controversies as expert

technical advisers, and not as advocates with a political stake in the decision."

General Taylor does not sit in judgment on these problems, but he quotes two opinions which might serve as guides for soldiers who find themselves in the dilemma of the German officers under the Nazi rule. The sources are diverse and the author does not put the quotations together in his text. The first is, peculiarly enough, from a book review by R. H. S. Crossman: "A democracy can only be preserved by the soldier's studied refusal to play politics; under a dictatorship, freedom can only be restored if the soldier leads the revolt." The other is from a comment on the responsibility of the leaders of the Wehrmacht made by the German General Ludwig back in 1938: "Their duty of soldierly obedience finds its limit when their knowledge, conscience and responsibility forbid the execution of an order."

The American tradition, well established but sometimes violated, that an officer should resign and then be free to act in accordance with the dictates of his conscience still seems to have much in its favor.—MAJ. GEN. H. W. BLAKELEY, Rtd.

#### THREE CHARACTERISTIC BATTLES

**THREE BATTLES: ARNAVILLE, ALTUZZO, AND SCHMIDT (U.S. Army in World War II).** By Charles B. MacDonald and Sidney T. Mathews. Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. 443 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.00.

It is no overstatement to say that this volume of the multivolume *U. S. Army in World War II* is the most important of all for officers of company grade and noncoms to read and understand. There are lessons in it, too, for field grade and general officers who must, after all, train and lead into battle today's and tomorrow's Army.

The three battles which the authors have re-created here were characteristic of many, many battalion and regimental actions in Italy, and in France and Germany. The first of these was the crossing of the Moselle at Arnaville, just south of Metz, between 8 and 15 September 1944. It came at the end of the long Third Army sweep across France to the gates of Metz, a sweep we now know would have had to end about where it did whether or not gasoline had been available. The Germans were not totally without reserves, and resistance to Third Army patrols was stiffening appreciably in the first days of September. But the Arnaville crossing was part of a plan which ordered a crossing of the Moselle, seizure of crossings on the Sarre, some thirty miles beyond the Moselle and, upon army order, a sweep to Mainz on the Rhine. Actually, the 7th Armored Division was unable, without infantry support, even to cross the Moselle, and it was many bitter weeks before Metz fell to the 5th Infantry Division and the 7th Armored.

The first of these studies, then, is a report by Charles B. MacDonald on the crossing of the Moselle at Dornot and Arnaville by the 10th and 11th Infantry

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Regiments of the 5th Infantry Division and CCB of the 7th Armored.

The second study, "Break-through at Monte Altuzzo," by Sidney T. Mathews, covers an action that was similar to the Arncliffe crossing in one way. The troops going into the action initially were overconfident, poorly prepared psychologically for the hammering they had to take. Planning and coordination below army and corps level were sketchy, which meant an interval of two days or more before commanders could take hold of the situation and bring it under control.

The Altuzzo battle was a fight for the peak that controlled Il Giogo Pass, through which ran the secondary highway from the Arno Valley into the Po Valley. The main Fifth Army effort was directed at Il Giogo Pass because the Germans held Futa Pass and Highway 65 so strongly. At Il Giogo the Gothic Line was weaker.

Yet the fight for Monte Altuzzo, the main effort of a powerful army, was carried by one regiment, the 338th of the 85th Division. This report is the story of that action, a complex and confused operation that was finally won as much by the weight of American artillery as by any other single factor.

"Objective: Schmidt," by Charles B. MacDonald, the third action of this volume, is a report on the 28th Infantry Division's November, 1944, attack against Schmidt, Germany, a town on high ground that overlooked (though at a considerable distance) the massive Schwammenauel Dam, one of the series of Roer River dams which the Germans could blow at any time to release a flood that would cut off any Roer crossing we made in the Aachen area. The division's attack, the historian reports, was a bloody and costly failure through no fault of its own.

The 28th Division attack was supposed to do too many things with too few troops. It was to gain maneuver room and additional supply routes for the impending VII Corps attack to the north, protect VII Corps right flank, seize ground for a line of departure for a later attack against the Roer dams, and attract enemy reserves away from the VII Corps attack.

As MacDonald points out, the division failed of its first three missions, or succeeded only partly. It registered a thundering success in its fourth mission, however, because VII Corps' attack did not come off on time. The weather was too bad for proper air support, and so there stood the 28th Division, making the only attack on either the First or Ninth Army fronts, an attack which received all the attention of the enemy reserves.

"Objective: Schmidt" is therefore primarily a report on the 112th Infantry's attack to seize Schmidt, the main objective of the division attack. It is a report of a calculated risk that failed.

These three actions will all find their places in the volumes of *U.S. Army in World War II* that cover the big picture. But MacDonald and Mathews have never-

theless been careful to see that none of the action they write about appears in a vacuum. They show clearly the big picture behind the action they describe, the supporting units and what they did, the actions of the units on the flanks, and the enemy situation taken from careful study of German documents.

We have here, then, the war in miniature, for campaigns are made up of many actions like these, any one of which may prove to be decisive out of all proportion to the number of men engaged—and that is the importance of this book. For in these pages are all of the elements that may win or lose, not just a battle, but a war. Each of these studies shows clearly how Infantry, Artillery, Armor, Engineers, Air Force, and other arms and services work together—or fail to work together. Each has been thoroughly researched and each is logically organized and sharply written. The actions move, and the reader can follow battalions, companies, squads, even individuals without the doubling back and twisting that is too often characteristic of such action reports.

Here the student can see, if he chooses to see, how important the fundamentals of military training are, how lack of communication between a company commander and a platoon leader can hold up an army, how vital it is for even the smallest unit to report its position accurately. Here, as they happened, are the disastrous results of superficial planning and inadequate reconnaissance. Here are the fruits of competent leadership, and the tragedy of the officer or NCO who cannot lead in battle.

It is important that we record the overall history of a great war, but it is equally important to publish studies of this kind. Their value to the man who must lead in war, be he regimental commander or squad leader, is beyond measure. Mr. MacDonald and Dr. Mathews deserve great credit for a work that should become a military classic.—O. C. S.

#### MILITARY EDITOR

**WILLIAM CONANT CHURCH & THE ARMY AND NAVY JOURNAL.** By Donald Nevius Bigelow. Columbia University Press, 1952. 266 Pages; Index; \$3.75.

William Conant Church left the Union Army in 1863, to found the *Army and Navy Journal*. His weekly featured accounts of military and naval actions by commanders and participants; the rest of the contents was supplied by Church himself—editorials, book reviews, necrologies, and the like. He had a low opinion of his sometimes intemperate "lay contemporaries," whose subscribers could read accurate dispatches by correspondents before official reports reached Washington. In fifteen years his paper became the recognized champion of the services, and Church was on intimate terms with practically all the important brass hats. By the turn of the century his *Journal's* influence began to wane with the appearance of the branch journals, edited by active officers with

modern ideas. Church died in 1917, and the paper soon went out of his family's control.

This book is not a history of the *Army and Navy Journal*, nor a definitive biography of its founder. It tells the story of why Church founded his paper and the policies he supported in its pages during the fifty-four years he was its editor.—N. J. A.

#### BOOKS RECEIVED

**SECRET TIBET.** By Foxco Maraini. The Viking Press, Inc. 306 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.50.

**THE YUGOSLAVS.** By Z. Kostelski. Philosophical Library. 498 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.75.

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